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Vogel: Manufacturing Solidarity: Adventure Training for Managers

MANUFACTURING SOLIDARITY:
ADVENTURE TRAINING FOR MANAGERS
Joan Vogel*

INTRODUCTION

Largely in response to competition from Japanese corporations'
whose employees are renowned for teamwork and esprit de corps,

many American corporations have turned to outdoor adventure programs to develop trust among their managers and identification with
the corporation's mission. 2 These programs take managers to wilderness areas for several days of intense physical activities such as rock
climbing, white water rafting, and ropes courses.3 Many of these

* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1981. I
gratefully acknowledge the comments and criticism of Richard Delgado, Gilbert Kujovich,
Pamela Stephens and Orrn Judd during the preparation of this manuscript.
1. The inspiration for corporate adventure programs may have come from Japanese
corporations, which often subject new employees, especially managers, to a physically and
psychologically demanding initiation. See T. ROHLEN, FOR HARMONY AND SmENGIH 192-211
(1974). For example, in an exercise called "roto" a bank's new managerial employees were
required to spend a day going from house to house in a strange community, begging for
work without pay. Trainees did any job household members asked them to do. This exercise
was intended to teach new employees the value of work and the need to serve customers.
See id. at 204-05. Other activities, including grueling physical exercises and forms of spiritual
training, tie the employees, hired for their working lives, to the corporation. See id. at 192211. The Disney Corporation has even imported the "hell camp" stress techniques (called
Kanrisha Yosei Gakko). See Conlin, The Making (or Brainwashing) of a Manager, SUCCESSFUL MEETINGS, Dec. 1988, at 35. The basic outline of these programs is not unlike that of
most adventure programs. See infra notes 13-40 and accompanying text.

2. At the present time, it is difficult to determine how many companies are using
adventure training programs. The literature indicates only those that have used tham in the
past. Adventure program brochures and other literature list somewhere around sixty-six
companies, large and small, that have used adventure programs. The list includes a number
of large, well-known companies such as Coca-Cola, Federal Express, AT&T, Adolph Coors
and Weyerhauser. See North Carolina Outward Bound School brochure; SportsMind, Inc.
brochure; Project Adventure's Executive Reach brochure; Black, Inside the Corporate Boot
Camps, M MAGAZINE, Feb. 1988, at 62; Conlin, supra note 1, at 31; Kane, Executive
Training in the Wild, SIGNATURE J., Oct. 1985, at 36-37; Petrini, Over the River and
Through the Woods, TRAINING & DEy. J., May 1990, at 25, 32; Long, The Wilderness Lab
Comes of Age, TRAINING & DEV. J., Mar. 1987, at 30 [hereinafter The Wilderness Lab].
3. See generally Black, supra note 2 (discussing common corporate adventure program
activities).
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activities are designed to create apprehension, which the participants
learn to overcome by "facing their fear," e.g., of heights or white
water, and by working with others to accomplish physical goals. As
with military boot camps, these challenges are supposed to bind participants to each other and instill greater unity once they return to the
workplace Further, like military basic training, these programs are
designed to "remake" executives
in the image of the organization and
6
differences.
individual
erase
to
This article will examine the operation of various outdoor programs, the psychological harms they may cause,7 and the means for

4. See id. at 61.
5. See id. at 63.
6. See Main, Trying to Bend Managers' Minds, FotUNE Dec. 23, 1987, at 95-96.
7. These outdoor adventure programs are designed to appear more dangerous than they
are. Each participant wears appropriate safety equipment and harnesses, and adventure counselors carefully guide participants in order to prevent physical injury. Although there is a
potential for physical injury, I discuss only psychological harm in this article. Liability for
physical injury is fairly straightforward. If the employer sponsors the program and expects
employees to participate and if the employee is physically injured, then the employer will be
liable for the injury under the workers' compensation system. See, e.g., Ezzy v. Workers'
Compensation, 146 Cal. App. 3d 252, 194 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1983); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v.
Indus. Comm'n, 61 Ill.
2d 139, 334 N.E.2d 136 (1975); Tobias v. Stormco Co., 282 A.D.
1087, 126 N.YS.2d 120 (App. Div. 1953). See also Gahin & Chesteen, Executives Contem.
plate the Call of the Wild, RISK MGMT, July, 10 1988, at 44 (discussing the impact of
adventure programs on executives). According to Gahin and Chesteen, physical injuries, even
fatalities, in outdoor training programs are not uncommon. The authors strongly advise
corporations contemplating use of outdoor programs to select the school carefully, to make
sure only medically fit employees go, and to make the program optional. See id. at 51. They
also recommend having employees sign a waiver of liability form. Id. For a discussion of the
effectiveness of these forms, see infra note 150.
One recent case involving fatalities on a white water rafting trip indicates the potential
for liability in the event that participants are injured on corporate outings. DDB Needham, an
advertising agency, organized a white water rafting trip down a treacherous stretch of the
Chilko River in British Columbia. The purpose of the trip was to entertain and woo clients
for the firm. During passage on the river, the raft hit a rock, overturned and threw eleven of
the twelve participants into the water. Five high-level executives were killed, including a
retired DDB Needham employee, whose widow sued the company in federal court. The jury
held DDB Needham liable for the death of the retired employee and awarded damages of
$1.1 million. At least two more cases growing out of this incident are pending. See Corsello,
Big Suits, AM. LAW., Jan-Feb. 1991, at 31; Hume & Teinowitz, $1.1 M Verdict in Chilko,
ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 3, 1990, at 1; King & Hinge, DDB Needham Liable For Death at
Outing, Wall St. J.,Dec. 4, 1990, at B4, col. 4-5. The widow of one of the agency's
employees who also drowned recovered for the death in workers' compensation. Telephone
Interview with Bruce Crowe, attorney for Lenore Fasules, Chicago, Illinois (Jan. 24, 1991).
Although this case did not involve a corporate adventure program like the ones discussed in
this article, the case is similar to adventure programs in that the president of DDB Needham
thought that a rafting trip away from the city would "bond" the clients to the ad agency.
The rafting trip was designed to be so challenging and eventful that the participants would
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redressing injuries when they occur. Section I will analyze different
types of outdoor training programs, their stated rationales and the
evidence of their effectiveness Section II will analyze potential tort
and contract remedies for the psychological trauma these programs
can cause, including actions for wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy.9 The final section
will propose a statute that prohibits the worst forms of outdoor and
other motivational training courses."
I.

OUTDOOR TRAINING PROGRAMS

Although wilderness training programs such as Outward Bound
have been in existence for many years, their widespread use in the
corporate setting began in the 1980's, when American companies
faced fierce competition from abroad and major upheavals at home
resulting from deregulation, mergers and acquisitions, leveraged
buyouts and forced downsizing. 1 These programs are, in part, an
effort by corporations to recreate the cohesiveness and camaraderie of
more affluent times." This section will analyze and critique the ba-

develop a permanent relationship from "touching the face of death" together. Telephone
interview with Bruce Crowe, attorney for Lenore Fasules, Chicago, Illinois (Jan. 25, 1991).
Unfortunately, the trip turned out to be memorable in the worst way. See also Hume, Fatal
Business Trip?: Chilko Case Hangs on DDB Needham's Role, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 19,

1990, at 6.
Although most of the planners of corporate adventure programs take greater care to
protect participants from injury than those who organized this trip, there is always the
possibility of injuries, especially in the risk-taking exercises. See infra notes 31-40 and
accompanying text. Employers are likely to be held liable for any injuries that occur. Unlike
James Fasules, injured employees are restricted to recovering for physical injuries under
workers' compensation.
8. See infra notes 11-84 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 85-358 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 359-87 and accompanying text.
11. See Bolt, How Executives Learn: The Move from Glitz to Guts, TRAINING & DEV.
J., May 1990, at 83, 87 [hereinafter How Executives Learn]; Conlin, supra note 1, at 30;
Dingle, Peak Performance, BLAcK ENTERPRISE, May 1989, at 64-66; Isenhart, An Investigation of the Interface Between Corporate Leadership Needs and the Outward Bound Expe-

rience, 32 COMM. EDUC. 123 (1983); J. BOLT, ExEcUTIvE DEVELOPMENT 3-7, 24-27 (1989)
[hereinafter BOLT].
12. See Conlin, supra note 1, at 30. Until recently, managers were almost exclusively
white males from upper middle class or upper class backgrounds who attended the same
colleges, belonged to the same social clubs, and came from similar ethnic backgrounds. W.
WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956). The camaraderie that existed in the past is due in
part to those similarities. Today, the workforce, managerial or otherwise, is far more heterogeneous. See P. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FuTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 5-6 (1990). Managers now come from diverse backgrounds with little social
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sic theory for the use of adventure programs in the corporate setting.13

A.

The Theory of ExperientialLearning

Experiential education is said to teach self-esteem, teamwork and
risk-taking by removing individuals from their normal environment
and challenging them to accomplish outdoor physical tasks such as
rope climbing, white water canoeing, or other survival activities.14
The emphasis is on learning by doing rather than by lectures or classroom discussions.1 5 These physical activities are intended as "metaphors" for other areas of the participant's life.1 6 If the participant is
able to ford a rushing stream, climb a steep cliff, or paddle through
rough white water, then he or she should have the confidence to meet
challenges in other areas of life.17 The exercises are also designed to
foster teamwork. 18 By facing physical challenges together, a group
of diverse individuals with little in common should be "bound together" by this experience. 19
These same principles are thought to apply to corporate adventure programs. 20 The corporation sends managers and executives to a

experience in common. Perhaps employers hope that adventure programs will create at least
one social experience that all will share.
13. The basic philosophy of wilderness or adventure programs was established by
Outward Bound, the first adventure training organization. Outward Bound was established
during World War II to train British merchant sailors to survive the rigors of merchant
shipping. See Isenhart, supra note 11, at 123; Gahin & Chesteen, supra note 7, at 44. Most
of the other adventure programs, such as Project Adventure, Rockpoint Reach and
SportsMind, were started by individuals who worked for or were trained by Outward Bound.
See Schoel, The Early Days, 9 ZI' LINES 1, 6 (FallAVinter 1986) (Project Adventure Newsletter). Later, founders of Outward Bound programs applied survival training to young people
in schools. Following this pattern, Project Adventure started as an alternative educational
program in the Massachusetts public schools. Id.
14. See Gahin & Chesteen, supra note 7, at 30-31;
Out of the Woods, but ....
TRAINING & DEv. J.,Mar.
11, at 123; Kane, supra note 2, at 36-37; The Wilderness
An Unorthodox Approach to Leadership, 63 PERSONNEL 4,

Gall, You Can Take the Manager
1987, at 54; Isenhart, supra note
Lab, supra note 2, at 58; Wagel,
4-6 (1986); Schoel, supra note 13,

at 6-7.
15. See Wagel, supra note 14, at 4.
16. See supra note 14; Gall, supra note 14, at 55; Isenhart, supra note 11, at 123-29.
17. See Gahin & Chesteen, supra note 7, at 44.
18. Id.
19. See Isenhart, supra note 11, at 123-29; Prouty, The Team as Hero: A Theme for the

Nineties, 15 ZIP LINES 1, 14 (Fall 1989/Winter 1990) (Project Adventure Newsletter) [hereinafter Prouty]; Somolowe, Executive Reach, 9 Zip LINES 7 (Fall/Winter 1986) (Project Adventure Newsletter); Gall, supra note 14, at 55.
20. Although there are a number of corporate adventure programs, the following are the
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rural or wilderness setting for a course that usually lasts three or four
days. During that time, the employees participate in a series of
team-building and risk-taking exercises.' The "trust fall" and the
"spider's web" are examples of the former.' In the trust fall, one
participant stands on a tree stump with his or her back to other group
members who line up and hold out their arms. The participant is then
told to fall back, and is caught by the others before he or she hits
the ground.' The spider's web requires participants to pass through
a series of ropes strung between two trees in a pattern resembling a
web.' The web consists of a series of holes each of which the

group may use only once. 26 The group is asked to pretend that the
ropes are electrified and should not be touched." To complete the
exercise successfully, participants must lift and carefully pass each

major programs: Center for Management and Organization Effectiveness, Bartlesville, Okla.;
Charles Conn Associates, Cambridge, Mass.; Colorado Outward Bound, Denver, Colo.; Corporate Adventure, Reston, Va.; Donovan Associates, Norwich, Vt.; Executive Adventure, Atlanta,
Ga.; Executive Challenge, Bedford, Mass.; Executive Expeditions, Marrietta, Ga.; Executive
Ventures Group, Denver, Colo.; Growing Edge, Peterborough, N.H.; High Challenge Trainings,
Pleasant Grove, Utah; High Impact Training, Long Branch, NJ.; Hurricane Island Outward
Bound, Roxland, Me.; Inner Quest, Leesburgh, Va.; The Leadership Connection, Highland
Lakes, NJ.; North Carolina Outward Bound, Morganton, N.C.; Organization Perspectives,
Annapolis, Md.; Pacific Crest Outward Bound, Santa Monica, Cal.; Pecos River Ranch, Santa
Fe, N.M.; Pine Ridge Adventure Center, Williston, Vt.; Project Adventure, Hamilton, Mass.;
Rockpoint Reach School, Burlington, Vt.; SportsMind, Seattle, Wash.; Voyager Outward
Bound School, Minnetonka, Minn. See Petrini, supra note 2, at 36.
21. See Somolowe, supra note 19, at 7.
Most corporations send only executives and managers to these programs, in part
because of the costs. These programs often cost several hundred dollars a day per participant.
In a large company, training all employees would be too expensive. Another reason for
limiting the programs to managers is that the emphasis on "risk-taking" assumes that the
employee is in a position to make decisions, and most important decisions in American
business are made by management.
22. See id.
23. I observed these and other exercises on July 24, 1990, at a one-day course conducted by the Rockpoint Reach School in Burlington, Vermont. Rockpoint Reach is part of the

physical education program for a private school. Its ropes course was designed by Project
Adventure a nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting adventure training for schools and,
more recently, for businesses. When not being used at the school, the ropes course is used
for corporate adventure training. On the day I attended, the course participants were employees of a nonprofit association. Interview with Alison Stringer, Director of the Rockpoint
Reach School, Burlington, Vermont (July 24, 1990).
24. For a more detailed discussion of this and other ropes exercises, see K. ROHNKE,
CowsmAns AND CoBRAs II 53-55 (1989). The assumption is that employees who help each
other go through the ropes exercises will do the same with other projects in the workplace.
25. See ROHNKP, supra note 24, at 106-08.
26. See id.
27. Id.
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person through most of the holes.' In the process of planning and
executing this task, group members are supposed to listen and work
together as a team.' With this and the other team exercises, the assumption is that members of the group will apply these lessons to the
workplace.' One responsibility of the group leader or facilitator,
who works for the adventure program, 31
is to make the connections
workplace.
the
and
exercises
the
between
The physical exercises used to encourage risk-taking are designed
to appear difficult and to induce fear in the average participant, even
when undertaken with appropriate safety equipment.3 2 Participants
might be required to climb up a steep rock, to walk across a six inch
beam twenty feet off the ground,33 or to climb down a steep cliff.
The objective is to require participants to face their fears and take a
chance with the encouragement of other group members.' The physical exercises are said to give participants new confidence in their
ability to take risks on the job and accomplish tasks that they believed were beyond their capabilities.3 s In one course, risk-taking is
taught by having the participants climb thirty-five feet up a "pamper
pole" and onto a small platform.' 6 They are then urged to leap off
the platform and catch hold of a trapeze swing some seven feet
away.37 Few are able to do so successfully.' Later, participants are
told to jump off the platform.39 Although ropes attached to a hip
and shoulder harness prevent participants from falling, these safety
measures are not designed to reduce, and, in fact, do not reduce, the

anxiety. 4
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. After each exercise, the group facilitator discussed how the exercises went and what
everyone learned in the process. Participants were encouraged to tie the lessons of the
exercise to that group's workplace.
32. The Wilderness Lab, supra note 2, at 36-37; Petrini, supra note 2, at 28; Robertson,
PA: Meeting the Challenge, Ti MEIRoNoIRTH Bus. REV, Aug. 1986, at 42.
33. The Wilderness Lab, supra note 2, at 36.
34. Id.
35. The Wilderness Lab, supra note 2, at 34-39. Van Zwieten, Training on the Rocks,
TRAINING & DEv. J., Jan. 1984, at 27-33.
36. See RoHNICE, supra note 24, at 122-23. A "pamper pole" is a straight pole some
thirty-five feet off the ground. Participants climb up a ladder and metal rungs on the side of
the pole to a small platform at the top. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. The 'pamper pole" exercise was part of the course that I observed. See supra note
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B. Critique of CorporateAdventure
Programs
Whatever virtues adventure programs may have when used in
other settings, their use in the corporate setting is troublesome. Many
jobs create some degree of stress and anxiety. But the stress and
anxiety created by wilderness programs appear to bear little relation-

ship to that which occurs in most workplaces. 41 Nor is there much
evidence that the learning that occurs during the adventure program

experience is transferred to the workplace in ways that might justify
the dangers these programs present. 42 Most of the evidence is testimonial, gathered by the programs themselves, and presented in hyperbolic form in promotional literature. For example, promotional literature for SportsMind proclaims that AT&T's participation in
SportsMind enhanced overall sales from 91% to over 160% of the
goal, and that AT&T customer services improved to first in the country. 43 Few other programs claim such far-reaching results,44 and
most are content to rely on general assertions
concerning the positive
4S
effect of their version of outdoor adventure.
While program brochures are likely to inflate results, it is more

23. On the day that I was present, one participant suffered a severe anxiety attack and
hyperventilated for several minutes before she could be lowered to the ground. All of the
others looked pale and shaken after they completed the exercise. The group leader did tell all
the participants that they could refuse to do this and other high ropes exercises. With the
employees' supervisor present, however, few are likely to refuse, and on the day I observed
the exercise none did refuse.
A similar exercise was documented on the Mac Neil/Lehrer Newshour on September
4, 1989. SportsMind, a local adventure program, required managers from Nike to climb the
pamper pole. The anxiety that the exercise produced was evident on the faces of the participants. The expert commentator in the report, Peter Drucker, criticized the use of such exercises as harming employees for no reason. He was convinced that adventure programs were
both dangerous and ineffective. See also Petrini, supra note 2, at 29-30.
41. See Gahin & Chesteen, supra note 7, at 49-50.
42. Id. at 49-51.
43. SportsMind brochure.
44. A Representative from the North Carolina Outward Bound Program, for example,
declined to predict results of that nature. Telephone conversation with Bo Hughes, Director of
Professional Development Programs (Mar. 1, 1990). No study has confirmed results of the
type claimed by SportsMind. See Gall, supra note 14, at 58.
45. The brochure for Project Adventure's corporate program, for example, offers vague
but positive statements from corporate clients: "You try so many approaches to deal with
team-building and communication issues, and when one fimally really works - it's great!"
Executive Reach brochure, Project Adventure, Hamilton, Mass. (quoting Denise Dorzan, Vice
President, Human Resources, Saddlebrook Corp.).
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disconcerting that much of the management and educational literature
has not been more incisive. Educational specialists, particularly those
enamored with experiential education, tend to be uncritical of the use
of these programs in the corporate setting.' The few serious studies
on corporate adventure programs do not demonstrate that they create
any lasting impact on productivity.' Two studies are illustrative.
One doctoral study focused on the short-term psychological effects on
participants in the Colorado Outward Bound Program.' Participants
filled out questionnaires before, during and after the adventure program.4 9 While the author reports that participants claimed to experience an increase in self-perception and self-confidence, this improvement faded shortly after completion of the program. ° The researcher
did not study the effects of the program on productivity and efficiency, 51 and found little effect on teamwork. 52 In another study of
managers from an aerospace company who completed a four-day
wilderness training program, researchers reported "a boost in morale"
and a higher retention rate for those who went through the program.5 Yet, much of the evidence for this assertion was subjective,
relying primarily on the perceptions of participants.4 Moreover, the
researchers were unable to document any increase in the company's

46. See, e.g., Ewert, Research in ExperientialEducation: An Overview, 10 J. EXPERIENTIAL EDUC. 4 (1987); Gass, Programmingthe Transfer of Learning in Adventure Education, 8
J. EXPERIENTIAL EDUC. 18 (1985); Kerr & Gass, A Group Development Model for Adventure
Education, 10 J. EXPERIaNTAL EDuc. 39 (1987); Riggins, Effective Learning in AdventureBased Education: Setting Directions for Future Research, J. ENVTL. EDUC., Fall 1986, at 1.
The more popular literature on adventure programs displays similar uncritical analysis.
See, eg., Galagan, Between Two Trapezes, TRAINING & DEv. J., Mar. 1987, at 40; Gall,
supra note 14, at 54; PetrinL, supra note 2; Van Zwieten, supra note 35, at 27; The Wilder.
ness Lab, supra note 2, at 30. One commentator stated that articles on outdoor programs are
"always written by proponents, and as yet we lack a cool review of what outdoor development does and does not offer." Mumford, What's New in Management Development, PERSONNEL MGMT, May 1985, at 30, 32.
47. See T. Galpin, The Impact of a Three-Day Outdoor Management Development
Course on Selected Self-Perceptions of the Participants (unpublished doctoral dissertation,
U.C.L.A. Dep't of Educ.); D. King & P. Harmon, Evaluation of The Colorado Outward
Bound School's Career Development Course Offered in Collaboration with the Training,
Education, and Employee Development Department of Martin-MariettaAerospace, iv-v, 17-19
(Oct. 1981) (unpublished study). See also Gall, supra note 14, at 58.
48. Galpin, supra note 47, at xi.
49. Id. at xii.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 69-70.
52. Id. at 114, 121-22.
53. King & Harmon, supra note 47, at 17-19.
54. Id. at 4.
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overall performance.'
Even if adventure programs were shown to improve corporate
performance, other concerns counsel caution. The risk exercises, for
example, deliberately induce anxiety in the participants. Reluctant or
fearful participants run the added humiliation of failing in front of
their colleagues. For example, one bank executive screamed and
yelled during an exercise when he and eight others "were required to
cross a river in one trip, using a canoe and an inner-tube."' It later
turned out that he was afraid of the water but could not admit it
because of peer pressure.'
Doubts about the propriety of trading on the emotional losses of
employees for the financial gain of the corporation increase when the
voluntariness of corporate adventure programs is considered. Some
programs insist that they will train only employees who volunteer,
and that they discourage employers from requiring employees to
participate.' However, few employees would feel free to refuse to
participate, aware that if they do not go they might jeopardize their
futures with the company. As one Federal Express regional director
stated: "There was nothing voluntary about coming here. When your
boss says he's organized a trip and would you like to come, then you
go and pack your bags." 59 The lack of choice makes the risk-taking
exercises of wilderness programs far more problematic in the corporate setting than elsewhere.
While not frightening, the team-building exercises have other
problems; in particular, the exercises require employees to interact
55. Sew id. at 17-19.
56. Black, supra note 2, at 67. In another program, the fear of heights caused one
employee to wet his pants when he climbed down a cliff. Symmonds, A School of Hard
Rocks, 130 Bus. Wr., Mar. 3, 1986, at 130.
57. Black, supra note 2, at 67. The potential 'of corporate adventure programs to
produce severe emotional distress is particularly disturbing given the lack of standards for the

content of the program or for the training of those who conduct them. It appears that almost
anyone can establish an adventure program. No state has a certification or licensing requirement. Although many operators are trained by other adventure programs, few of them have
backgrounds in psychology or counseling. Yet, they are operating programs which are designed to expose participants' deepest fears and anxieties.
58. Telephone interview with Bo Hughes, Director of Professional Development Programs, North Carolina Outward Bound (March 1, 1990); Telephone interview with Alison
Stringer, Director of Rockpoint Reach, Burlington, Vt. (June 12, 1990).
59. Black, supra note 2, at 62. A Director of Planning and Administration for Federal

Express has stated that "two people didn't make it. They have the right to say no, but when
we get back, they'll be separated by not having shared the same experience." Id. See also

Dingle, supra note 11, at 64 (noting that an employee was told that she would be going on
the course).
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with each other on a more intimate level than they might otherwise
choose to on their own. For example, team exercises often require
participants to engage in an extensive amount of touching and other
physical contact, behavior usually reserved for intimate relationships.' The offensiveness of unwanted intimacies may be increased
when the program 'includes both male and female participants. 61 As
discussed later, the "forced intimacy" of adventure programs might
constitute an unjustified invasion of participants' privacy.62
An additional concern about these programs is their assumption
that lack of group cohesion and reluctance to take risks are owing to
flaws or failures of individual employees rather than to the inadequacies of the corporate environment. 6' After the "quick fix" of an adventure program, the corporation's employees return to the same work
environment.'" Yet, many of the problems attributed to employees
are not of their own making but are the products of the rapid and
dramatic changes of the last decade. Corporate employees, including
middle managers and executives, have far less job security than in the
past.' A lack of security - the feeling that everyone's job is on

60. See Black, supra note 2, at 66 (describing the "human wall').
61. One particularly crude example of forced intimacy was evident in a rowing exercise
during one of Outward Bound's programs in Maine. In that exercise, the only woman executive on a Federal Express outing was made to feel like a "wimp" when she refused to
follow the male example of urinating off the side of the boat. Black, supra note 2, at 66.
62. See infra notes 181-93 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 65-70.
64. See Black, supra note 2, at 68. As one CEO explained:
I think too many companies might see this as a quick way to build team spirit.
They think it's the American way to take a short-cut. The companies that see this
as a cure-all remind me of the old saying: "Everybody wants to go to heaven, but
nobody wants to die."
Id. at 60. See also Huszczo, Trainingfor Team Building, TRAINING & DaV. J.,Feb. 1990, at
37, 40; Conlin, supra note 1, at 32.
65. This insecurity has firm empirical foundations. Managers have lost a number of
jobs, especially in manufacturing. Between 1979 and 1983, an estimated 700,000 managers
and professionals employed at their firms for three years or more lost their jobs. Belous,
How Human Resource Systems Adjust to the Shift Toward Contingent Workers, MONTHLY
LAB. Ruv. Mar. 1989, at 7, 9. In 1985-86, "an additional 600,000 middle and upper level
executives lost their jobs." Id.; see also Freedman, Jobs: Insecurity at all Levels, ACROSS THB
BD., Jan. 1986, at 4, 5; Gordon, Who Killed CorporateLoyalty? TRAINING, Mar. 1990, at 25,
26-28; Herz, Worker Displacement in a Period of Rapid Job Expansion: 1983-1987, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1990, at 21, 26-28; Hoerr & Zellner, A Japanese Import That's Not
Selling, Bus. WK, Feb. 26, 1990, at 86-87; Kessler, Managers Without a Company, FOR'IuNE, Oct. 28, 1985, at 51; Rhodes, Employee Loyalty Is An Attainable Goal, J. BUS.
STRATEGY, Nov-Dec. 1989, at 51-52. With a new recession, job losses and insecurity will
worsen. See Cooper & Madigan, A Painful New Year Hangover That's Going to Last A
Whil, Bus. WK., Dec. 31, 1990, at 37; Cooper & Madigan, That Pounding on the Pavement
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the line and all are competing for jobs - undoubtedly affects group
cohesion and the willingness of managers to trust each other.' Adventure programs assume that managers need to be taught mutual
trust and teamwork.' Yet, insecurity and lack of trust may be per-

fectly rational responses to a troubled work environment. What employees need is not a short, stress-filled wilderness program but a

corporate environment that allows them to work with each other
without undermining their own positions in the company.'
Similarly, corporations legitimately need to encourage managers

to take risks.' But often, managers find that making risky business
decisions, especially those that do not produce short-term results,
jeopardizes their tenure with the company. The Japanese experience
indicates that greater group cohesion and a long-term view come from
creating a supportive environment over a long period of time, not

Isn't Holiday Shoppers, BUS. WK,Dec. 24, 1990 at 15; Pennar & McNamee, The New Face
of Recession, BUS. WL., Dec. 24, 1990, at 58; Hershey, Joblessness in U.S. Increases to
6.1%, Highest Since 1987, N.Y. Tunes, Jan. 5, 1991, at 1, col. 3; Murray, Recession Spreads
Throughout the Economy, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1991, at A2, col.2.
For a more detailed discussion of the detrimental effects of corporate restructuring and
deindustrialization, see, e.g., B. HARRISON & B. BLUESTNE, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATON OF
AMERICA (1982); B. HARRISON & B. BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN: CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND THE POLARIZING OF AMERICA, (1988); S. COHEN & J. ZYSMAN, MANUFACTuRING MATrERS: THE MYTH OF THE POST-INDuSTRIAL ECONOMY (1987); R. KtrrNER,
ECONOMIC ILLUSION: FALSE CHOICES BETWEEN PROSPERrY AND SOUND JUS1CE (1984);
WEILER, supra note 12.
66. See Gordon, supra note 65, at 25. One article presents a graphic description of the
effects of insecurity:
The firings, cutbacks, and forced retirements are sending an ominous message to
managers ....
Though most of them have no formal employment contract, they
did perceive an implicit contract that practically guaranteed lifetime jobs in exchange for competence, honesty, loyalty, and hard work. This contract has been
broken .... Even those who survive the shake-ups are affected, and this may
bode ill for their employers. Some managers may become more cautious, lest they
call attention to themselves. Anthony Carnevale, chief economist at the American
Society for Training and Development, a professional association of human resource
managers, says: "The people we expect to be the most creative and flexible now
work in the most insecure environment and I don't think that's a good mix. Insecurity reduces productivity since it makes people more political, more afraid to
take chances."
"Of course, turnover is increasing," says Robert Hecht, Chairman of LeeHecht & Associates, an "outplacement" firm. "Managers are jockeying for position
and keeping an eye on the door - to see if they'll get pushed or should jump
ship first."
Kessler, supra note 65, at 52.
67. Black, supra note 2, at 61.
68. Id. at 67
69. Id. at 63.
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70
from facing risks in an artificial setting for a few days.
Some corporate adventure programs also introduce arbitrary or
irrelevant factors into the process of evaluating employees. 71 Although directors of adventure programs disapprove of the practice,
they readily admit that there is no way they can prevent the company
from evaluating employees based on their performance in the program. Consequently, employees are not only subjected to unusual

70. In Japan, the core employees of large companies, approximately twenty to thirty
percent of the work force, have lifetime employment security. See R. DORF, TAIMNG JAPAN
SERIOUSLY: A CONFUCIAN PERSPECITVE ON LENDING ECONOMIC ISSUES 28-32 (1987) [hereinafter TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY]; R. DORE, FLEXIBLE RIGIDITIES: INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND
STRUCIURAL ADJUSTMENT IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 1970-80 72, 114-15 (1986) [hereinafter FLEXIBLE RIGIDITES]; WEILER, supra note 12, at 70; Billesbach & Rives, Lifetime Employment: Future Prospects for Japan and the U.S., ADVANCED MGMT. J., Autumn 1985, at
26-27 [hereinafter Billesbach & Rives]. During their work lives with a Japanese company,
employees can expect to perform a variety of jobs and undergo extensive periods of training
to learn these different jobs. See TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY, at 28. With this security, Japanese managers are better able to take a longer view or perspective and are not threatened by
other managers in the firm. This kind of employment security encourages the kind of teamwork and commitment that American companies claim to want. See, eg., id. at 29-31, 108.09, 141-42. Even so, employment security has not caught on in this country despite its
popularity with many commentators. Only companies that are unionized provide any significant employment security. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 12, at 68-71; W. OUCHI, THEORY Z:
How AMERICAN BUSINESS CAN MEET THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE 117-19 (1981); Billesbach
& Rives, at 29-46; Hoerr & Zelner, supra note 65, at 86-87.
However, lifetime employment security in Japan exists only for male employees;
women are expected to leave when they marry. Few women are even hired into professional
or managerial positions. Many larger firms can provide security to their core employees by
having a significant number of part-time or temporary workers, many of them women, who
can be fired or laid off as business cycles dictate. The core employees are expected to retire
early, usually at age 55. Unlike in American companies, job mobility is extremely limited in

Japan. "Because losing or quitting a job is an admission of inadequacy, any job loss makes
it difficult for an individual to find another job of comparable salary, rank and job security."
Billesbach & Rives, at 27. See also TAK3NG JAPAN SERIOUSLY, at 29-32; FLEXIBLE RIGIDIIES, at 114-15; OUCH!, at 17-25; WEILER, supra note 12, at 68-71. If American companies
are going to adopt employment security, they will have to rely on different cultural traditions
than Japan. Dore attributes lifetime employment security to a Confucian tradition embodied in
a community model of labor relations. TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY, at 85-107. Several American commentators have presented elaborate frameworks for how such a system could work in
this country. See OUCHI, at 117-29; WEILER, supra note 12, at 68-71, 186-224; WORK IN
AMERICA INSiurE, EMPLOYMENT SECURITY IN A FREE ECONOMY (1984).
71. See Black, supra note 2, at 62 (noting that continued success of corporate adventure
programs may lead to employee evaluation based, in part, upon skills not employed during
the normal course of employment).
72. Alison Stringer, Director of the Rockpoint Reach program in Burlington, Vermont
explained that she would not keep a corporate client that evaluated employees on their
performance in the outdoor program. Telephone interview with Alison Stringer, Director of
the Rockpoint Reach Program, Burlington, Vt. (June 13, 1990). How Rockpoint Reach or any
other adventure program would know if the corporation did evaluate employees based on
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physical and psychological challenges, they may also find that their
futures with the company have been injured by their performance on
activities unrelated to their jobs. Employees have a right to expect
that their job performance, not outdoor programs, will determine their
prospects for retention and advancement.
Another objection to corporate adventure programs stems from
their adoption of a quasi-military, and therefore predominantly male,
model of individual and social organization that devalues and excludes other approaches.' For example, SportsMind practices a war
game called "Samurai" in which participants are organized into two
teams that battle each other according to the code of the Samurai.74
Each team is told to develop their own "corporate cultures" with
simple uniforms, chants and other rituals. Team members are required
to protect their leader to the death if necessary.7 s More generally,

their performance in the program is uncertain. Certainly most participants seem to believe that
they are being evaluated. See Black, supra note 2, at 65.
73. Outward Bound's origin, in British World War II maritime survival training, indicates strong ties between adventure programs and military training. See Isenhart, supra note
11, at 123; Schoel, supra note 13, at 6. (discussing Project Adventure); Wolman, Training
Among the Trees: Sending Your Executives Out-of-Doors, NORTHEAST TRAINING NEWS, Dec.
1981, at 1.
The language used in program brochures further demonstrates their militaristic frame
of mind. For example, the SportsMind brochure boasts of the program's military characteristics and applications:
In 1982 the U.S. Army asked SportsMind to help create and implement a
new training system for the modem soldier. Working with both the Infantry and
the elite Special Forces, SportsMind's techniques for developing mind and body
fitness for combat soldiers produced dramatic results. Moreover, our team cohesion
tactics gained enthusiastic acceptance and led to a revised model of military leadership.
SportsMind soon recognized a need for peak performance training in today's
corporations - where people are under pressure to perform even more consistently
than athletes. We developed and tested a unique and innovative series of programs
that produce unprecedented performance breakthroughs for individuals, for teams,
and businesses.
SportsMind brochure, Seattle, Wash. (1989).
74. See Von Oecb, Let's Get Physical, Bus. MoNTH, Mar. 1990, at 60 (describing
"Samurai').
75. Petrini, supra note 2, at 30. This war game is designed to convince employees that
a successful corporation needs the kind of team spirit and corporate loyalty that successful
Japanese corporations - American companies' greatest competition - have cultivated. Id.
This crude rendition of Japanese culture only feeds the worst stereotypes about the success of
Japanese corporations. Japanese corporations are successful not only because they have
adapted Confucian and other cultural traditions to the requirements of modem industry, but
also because they have developed a more flexible and efficient use of labor and technology
than their American counterparts. For a more detailed discussion of Japanese companies, see
R. DORE, BRITISH FACTORY-JAPANESE FACTORY (1973); R. DORE & M. SAKo, How THE
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adventure programs create group cohesion by subjecting participants
to physical and psychological stresses in the belief that participants
later will be bound to each other by having "survived" such experiences.76 This approach places a high premium on physical activities
and risks, and devalues discussion - as if little is learned until participants are given a tangible physical demonstration of the principles
of trust and the need for group cohesion. 7
Much of the theory behind adventure programs betrays not only
their military roots but also their use with young people in the
schools.7' Participants are presumed to be unable to understand basic
79
principles of social organization without concrete demonstrations.
Whatever value experiential outdoor education may have with children, using these programs with adults, particularly in the compulsory
setting of a corporation, presents serious issues of abuse that the legal
system will soon be called upon to confront.
Not only do the programs infantilize participants, but their emphasis on physical prowess, and deemphasis on other socializing
skills, disadvantages women.' If called on to increase teamwork and
trust, women, who tend to be more comfortable expressing emotions,
might bring all employees involved together and discuss the obstacles
to teamwork and trust that exist.' Adventure programs assume that
the only way to generate effective discussions is to require participants to perform physical tasks.' As a result, they deemphasize the

JAPANESE LEARN TO WORK (1989); S. COHEN & J. ZYSMAN, MANUFACTURING MATrERS
(1987); ROHLEN, supra note 1. In Great Britain, the London Action Development Company
created a "war game" where executives work as a team to destroy the enemy. The idea is
that the executives would be bound together in "the brotherhood of war." Conlin, supra note
1, at 31.
76. See Black, supra note 2, at 62.
77. See Galagan, supra note 46, at 40-41; Isenhart, supra note 11, at 123-24; The
Wilderness Lab, supra note 2, at 30-32; Kane, supra note 2, at 36-38. See also Gall, supra

note 14, at 54-56
78. In fact, Outward Bound and Project Adventure were developed to train young
people of school age. Certainly, the trust fall described earlier, see supra notes 23-24, has all

the hallmarks of a child's game. This exercise is designed to teach participants that there are
times when they "must learn" to trust others. Like children, participants cannot truly understand how to trust without such a concrete demonstration. See Galagan, supra note 46, at 43.

79. For example, the Rockpoint Reach School is actually a physical education program
used by a private elementary and secondary school in Burlington, Vermont. See ROHNKE,
supra note 24 (noting that the same exercises used for children are also used in the corporate program).

80. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
81. See generally West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L REV. 1 (1988).
82. "[W]omen do not struggle toward connection with others, against what turn out to
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very social skills at which many women excel.S Performance of
male-dominated tasks, such as those called for by outdoor programs,
may disadvantage female managers if this performance is used to
evaluate whether the employee is "company material."'
II.

TORT AND CONTRACt CAUSES OF AcInON
AGAINST EMPLOYERS AND OPERATORS

OF ADVENTURE PROGRAMS

Employees might sue their employers and operators of adventure
training programs in the event of injury suffered during the adventure
program or in the event of discharge for refusal to take part in a
course. The principal causes of action are intentional infliction of
and wrongful disemotional distress, ss , invasion of privacy'
charge.' Corporate training programs are a new area for legal liability; as yet, there are no reported cases defining the liability of either
employers or program operators. However, given the risks associated

be insurmountable obstacles. Intimacy is not something which women fight to become capable

of. We just do it. It is ridiculously easy." West, supra note 81, at 40.

See also Scales,

SurvMiing Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15 VT. L REV. 139, 144 (1990) (quoting West). See generally S. HARDESTY & N. JACOBS, SUCCESS AND BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS
OF WOMEN IN CORPORATE AMERICA (1986); N. JosEFOwrTZ, PATHS To POWER: A WOMAN's
GUIDE FROM FIRST JOB 70 TOP EXECUTVE (1980); P. MCBROOM, THE THIRD SEX: THE
NEW PROFESSIONAL WOMAN (1986); J. MARsHAu,

WOMEN MANAGERS: TRAVELLERS IN A

MALE WORLD (1984); G. POWELL, WOMEN & MEN IN MANAGEMENT (1988); Rosener, Ways
Women Lead, 68 HARV. Bus. REV. 119 (1990); Debate: Ways Men and Women Lead, 69
HARV. Bus. Rv. 150 (1991).
83. See Rosener, supra note 82, at 120.

84. Although I do not further explore in this article the gender dimensions of wilderness
or outdoor corporate programs, it is worth noting that employers who require employees to
go through these programs may be exposing themselves to liability under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000aa-12 (1988). A subsequent article will explore
in-depth the gender-based assumptions in adventure programs and other aspects of the corporate environment.
85. See infra notes 89-153 and accompanying text (discussing intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
86. See infra notes 154-206 and accompanying text (discussing invasion of privacy).
There are four causes of action that fall under the rubric of invasion of privacy: (1) appropriation of name and likeness, (2) intrusion upon seclusion, (3) public disclosure of private
facts, and (4) false light. See I. SHEPHARD, R. DUSTON & K RUSSELL, WORKPLACE PRIVACY
26-29 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter WORKPLACE PRIVACY].
87. See infra notes 207-358 and accompanying text (discussing wrongful discharge). Like

invasion of privacy, the term "wrongful discharge" is an amalgamation of several causes of
action. Some are contract causes of action (implied contract, contracts from written materials
such as personnel manuals); one is a tort cause of action (wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy); and another is a hybrid tort and contract cause of action (implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing).
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with adventure programs discussed in section I of this article, it is
only a matter of time before someone brings a suit. This section will
explore whether existing law is adequate to provide redress for the
kind of emotional injuries that stress training can cause.8
A.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress

Since one of the major purposes of outdoor training programs is
to put employees deliberately into frightening or stressful situations,89 intentional infliction of emotional distress is the most obvious tort cause of action available to injured employees. Although this
tort action was not developed for the employment setting, employees
have frequently used it to seek redress for emotional distress caused
by employer conduct. 90 They have had some success, but only in
extreme cases. 9' This reluctance to find liability is due, in part, to

88.

Outdoor training programs are not the only unorthodox training programs designed

to increase efficiency and productivity that create risks of injury to employees. Other programs use techniques similar to brainwashing. Some of the "New Age" motivational training
programs such as Transformational Technologies established by Werner Erhard and a similar
program established by the Church of Scientology promise to increase productivity by "remodeling" employee attitudes in intense training sessions that subject employees to the kind
of techniques normally associated with religious cults. Main, Trying to Bend Managers'
Minds, FORTUNE, Nov. 23, 1987, at 95-96. Pacific Bell used New Age techniques to "overhaul its corporate culture" after its divestiture from AT&T. Id. at 100. Investigation by the
California Public Utilities Commission found that the training program was coercive, damaging to employees and enormously expensive. In addition, the program yielded few tangible
benefits. Id. Reports on the Scientology training are even more disturbing. Employees reported
that they were forced to participate in cult group activities that caused severe trauma. Em.
ployees unwilling to go to the sessions were fired or told they had little future with the
company. Id. at 104. See also Conlin, supra note 1, at 32-36.
The adventure programs discussed in this article do not generally employ the kind of
brainwashing techniques employed by the "New Age" programs but do try to change employee behavior in ways which raise sone of the same issues. One adventure program, the Pecos
Learning Center, employs more "New Age" techniques in the program. Participants are often
required to make personal confessions, and engage in "games" designed to increase "personal
intimacy" with other participants. Id. at 105-06. Most of the other programs concentrate more
on physical exercises and have directed discussions about the lessons of the exercises with
the group. Nonetheless, the emotional distress that these can create are just as disturbing.
89. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
90. See, eg., Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz. 38, 734 P.2d 580 (1987); Rulon-Miller v.
IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984); Hall v. May Dep't Stores Co., 292
Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981); Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc, 54 Or. App. 480, 635 P.2d 657
(1981); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976); Austin,
Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 41 STAN. L RELV.
1 (1988).
91. See Austin, supra note 90.
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the amorphous character of the tort, and the concern that a broad
interpretation may create a flood of employment cases and undermine
the employment-at-will doctrine. 92 Courts might also be concerned
that employment practices that cause some degree of emotional harm
to employees are necessary to the efficient functioning of the
workplace. 93 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to
show intentional infliction of emotional distress,' the plaintiff must
establish: (1) that the defendant engaged in "extreme and outrageous
conduct," (2) which "intentionally or recklessly" (3) caused (4) severe
emotional distress.95 Of these elements, employees may encounter
difficulty establishing that adventure training programs constitute
extreme and outrageous conduct, and that employers intended to
cause, or were reckless with regard to causing, emotional harm. Even
if an injured employee can establish the elements of the tort, the
employer may still prevail if it establishes that employees consented
to participate.
1. Extreme or Outrageous Conduct
As one writer has indicated, the most important element of this
tort is whether the defendant's behavior constitutes extreme or outrageous conduct. 96 In fact, if the plaintiff can establish this element,
courts are prone to find that the elements of causation, intent and
severe distress have been satisfied. 97 Courts are more likely to find

92. See Austin, supra note 90, at 7-9; see also Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 58

N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (noting that emotional distress claims
should not undermine the at-will rule).
93. Austin, supra note 90, at 1-11.
94. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 46 (1965). Intentional infliction of emotional
distress is defined in relevant part as follows: "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for
such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm." Id. at § 46(1).
95. Id. See also Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous ConducA 82

CotJM. L REv. 42, 47-48 (1982).
96. Givelber, supra note 95, at 46-54.

97. Id. at 48-49. See also Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr.
524, 534 (1984) (noting that discharging an employee for dating a former manager who was
working for a rival company was outrageous, and therefore distressing to the plaintiff);
Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 54 Or. App. 480, 635 P.2d 653 (1981) (conducting a strip search
in front of a customer was obviously distressing to a young, shy employee).
However, some courts still require a significant showing of extreme distress. See, e.g.,
Cafferty v. Garcia's of Scottsdale, Inc., 375 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985);
Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212 (1985); Evard v. Jacobson, 117 Wis. 2d
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the requisite degree of outrageousness when the defendant has power
over the plaintiff derived from a contractual or status relationship landlord-tenant, creditor-debtor, or employer-employee - and the
defendant appears to be using this power to inflict emotional harm.'
Even then, however, the defendant's behavior must be fairly abusive.' As a general matter, courts do not question the legitimacy of
these relationships no matter how unequal they are,"° but rather impose liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress to regulate
the relationship and to keep the more powerful party within civilized
bounds.'' In the employment setting, courts accept that the employer will inflict distress on employees in the everyday operation of the
workplace."° A degree of brusqueness or even insensitivity is per03
missible when necessary to assure performance of essential tasks."

69, 342 N.W.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1983); Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. App. 560, 380 A.2d 611
(1977); Givelber, supra note 95, at 48-49 n.29; Austin, supra note 90, at 16-17.
One commentator is critical of the requirement that the employee show extreme
distress. This requirement denies recovery to workers who "displayed greater resourcefulness
and adaptability" even if the employer's conduct was outrageous. Austin, supra note 91, at
17. This requirement can create strange results as, for example, when courts have denied
recovery to some plaintiffs while allowing others to recover in the same suit. In Moniodis,
all four employees established that requiring them to take an illegal polygraph test was
outrageous but the appellate court reversed the jury award and allowed only one employee to
recover. The court held that the rest were not adequately distressed. Moniodis, 64 Md. App.
at 15-16, 454 A.2d at 219. See Austin, supra note 90, at 17. Employees should be able to
recover if the employer's behavior is outrageous. He or she should not be penalized for
failing to fall apart. Givelber suggests that sometimes courts require a greater showing of
distress if they are not entirely convinced that the defendant's behavior is outrageous.
Givelber, supra note 95, at 48-49 n.29.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 46 comment e (1965); Givelber, supra note
95, at 53, 62-69. The reason unequal power matters in defining this tort is the common
sense understanding that when the defendant has such power, the injured party can neither
ignore the abuse nor fight back. See also PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 12 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. See, eg., Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88
Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977) (employer-employee); Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66
I11.2d 85, 360 N.E. 2d 765 (1976) (creditor-debtor); Newby v. Alto Riviera Apts., 60 Cal.
App. 3d 288, 131 Cal Rplr. 547 (1976) (landlord-tenant); George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359
Mass. 244, 268 N.E. 2d 915 (1971) (creditor-debtor); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d
493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970) (employer-employee); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l
Life Ins. Co, 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (insurer-insured); LaSalle
Extension Univ. v. Fogerty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934) (creditor-debtor). For
additional employment cases see infra note 130.
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment e. See also Givelber, supra
note 95, at 53.
100. See Austin, supra note 90.
101. Givelber, supra note 95, at 62, 74.
102. Austin, supra note 90, at 5-12.
103. Id.
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Adventure programs, however, often include activities that have
little, if any, relationship to the workplace responsibilities of the employee-participants. 4 Moreover, adventure program activities are
often designed to be stressful, whereas the stress of the workplace is
normally incidental to an activity with immediate purposes other than
the creation of stress. The tenuous connection between adventure
programs and legitimate expectations of the workplace, and the deliberate emphasis on stressful activities, may make it easier for employees to establish that employer conduct exceeds acceptable limits. The
caselaw suggests that the farther the conduct or activity is removed
from the legitimate requirements of the job, the more likely that a
court will find it to be outrageous and extreme. 5 For example, in
Rulon-Miller v. IBM, °6 a supervisor fired the plaintiff for having a
romantic relationship with a former employee who had left to work
for a rival company.' 7 The discharge contravened a company policy
which protected employees' private lives unless the company could
show that the relationship threatened its legitimate business interests.10 Finding that the employee was penalized "for conduct unrelated to her work," °9 the court concluded that under all the circumstances of the case the employer's behavior was outrageous.1 0
Rulon-Miller suggests a number of features that ought to be
expected in any determination of outrageous conduct. First, whether a
tortfeasor's action rises to the level of outrageousness depends, in
part, on the setting in which the conduct occurs. In the employment
setting, employer practices that intrude into the personal lives of

104. See supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
105. See Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984) (noting
that discharge because of an affair with a former employer was considered outrageous conduct). When employers intrude on private behavior beyond the workplace, sometimes courts
will find this interference to be outrageous. See Austin, supra note 90, at 8 n.26. However,
when off-duty conduct affects legitimate employer concerns, courts do not find the employer
liable. See, eg., Woodring v. Bd. of Grand Trustees, 633 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Va. 1986)
(stating that an employer could discharge an employee after his wife died when his wife was
crucial to success of the job); Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 301 Or. 117, 719 P.2d 854 (1986)
(holding that termination for fraternization with an employee provided no cause of action).
See infra notes 160-206 (discussing invasion of privacy).
106. 162 Cal. App. 3d at 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 524 (1984). Rulon-Miller is also an
important wrongful discharge case.
107. Id. at 244-46, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 527-29.
108. Id. at 246, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
109. Id.

110. Other circumstances that the court considered relevant to its conclusion were that the
supervisor at first gave plaintiff a choice about terminating her involvement, but then said the
relationship had to end. When she complained, he terminated her. Id.
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employees are more likely to be outrageous than those more directly
related to the employee's job responsibilities. Second, Rulon-Miller
suggests that unless the connection to the workplace is self-evident,
the employer has some burden of showing that its intrusion is jobrelated. The activities of adventure programs can intrude into deeply
personal aspects of an employee's life. They require employees to
expose their most elemental and private fears to supervisors and coworkers. Whether these demands constitute outrageous conduct should
depend, in part, on the extent and directness of their relationship to
legitimate requirements of the workplace. As indicated earlier, this
connection seems weak; at any rate, it has not been established in
any reliable study."' Employers resisting an allegation of outrageous conduct should have the burden of establishing that connection.
Even if the employer offers some proof that the adventure program activities improve managerial, and therefore corporate, performance, adventure activities may nevertheless constitute outrageous
conduct. Courts in Oregon and in other states have held employers
liable foi" outrageous and extreme conduct despite a clear connection
2
to the needs of the workplace." In Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc.,13
an irate customer charged that the plaintiff, a cashier, took money
that the customer had left on the counter. 1 4 After searching the
employee's jacket, in order to placate the customer, the manager had
a female assistant manager take the employee into the women's
restroom to conduct a strip search of the employee in front of the
customer,"- no money was found. 1 6 The plaintiff quit her job the
next day." 7 The Oregon court found that, while the manager was
legitimately concerned with the possibility of theft, a jury could find
that subjecting the employee to a humiliating strip search to placate
an irate customer was outrageous conduct." 8
Similarly, in Hall v. May Dep't Stores Co.," 9 a supervisor accused the plaintiff of stealing money. The supervisor did not have
convincing evidence of the employee's guilt, but nevertheless threat-

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See supra notes 41-55 and acompanying text.
See supra note 98.
54 Or. App. 480, 635 P.2d 657 (1981).
Id. at 481-83, 635 P.2d at 658-59.
Id. at 483, 635 P.2d at 659.
Id. at 484, 635 P.2d at 658-59.
Id. at 484, 635 P.2d at 660.
Id. at 484, 635 P.2d at 660-61.
292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981).
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ened her with "prosecution and imprisonment"' 20 in order to frighten her into confessing to the theft.12 ' After the interview, the plaintiff was forced to quit her job. The court recognized that the supervisor may have been pursuing the employer's legitimate interest in
detecting employee theft." It concluded, however, that intentionally
subjecting the employee to a hostile confrontation constituted outrageous conduct in light of the "scanty evidence" of the employee's
23
guilt.
Bodewig and Hall establish that conduct may be outrageous even
if it is related to the employer's legitimate concerns; the fact that an
employer sees a possible benefit to itself from abuse of an employee
does not excuse that abuse. When an adventure program forces employees to expose and confront their fear of falling 24 or
drowning 2 5 or suffer public humiliation,' 2 6 the distress produced
seems no less outrageous than that suffered by an employee forced to
confess to a crime. It thus seems likely that the more egregious forms
of corporate exercises will result in liability. But it is not at all clear
how far courts will go in imposing limits on the use of stress-inducing methods in pursuit of improved performance and profit. 27
2. Intent
Injured employees should have little difficulty satisfying the
intent requirement because adventure programs deliberately create
stressful conditions. Indeed, it is the overcoming of deliberately induced anxiety or fear that is thought to change the participants' attitudes by forcing them to "face their personal dragons." 12 Employ-

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 139, 637 P.2d at 131.
Id. at 140-41, 637 P.2d at 131-32.
Id. at 139-42, 637 P.2d at 131-32.
Id. at 139.40, 637 P.2d at 131-33.
See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.

126. See supra note 61.

127. Liability for abusive employer practices is potentially very large if abusive practices
are as widespread as some have suggested. Austin, supra note 90, at 49-51. However, it
would be odd for a court to decide that employers are not liable because abuse is widespread. Certainly, outrageous behavior should not be treated as ordinary and appropriate
because it is widespread. Id.
128. See supra notes 7-9, 16-20, 33-34 and accompanying text. The outdoor exercises
designed to encourage teamwork are not as clearly intended to induce emotional distress.
However, these exercises may pressure participants into revealing private, emotional feelings
to other participants in ways that may harm them later. The teamwork exercises can force
employees to be more intimate with co-workers than they might choose to be on their own.
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ers might argue that while they intend to change attitudes they do not
intend to cause severe distress. However, a showing of intent does
not require that the employer intend severe harm; it is enough that
the employer intended to "act... in a manner that can be considered
outrageous."129 If courts consider these programs to constitute outrageous conduct, then subjecting employees to the rigors of these programs is enough to show intent.13 Even if the employer argues that
it did not intend to cause severe emotional harm, the Restatement
formulation also allows a finding of liability if the defendant is reckless as regards the possibility that the outrageous conduct would
the risks, these programs are often,
cause severe distress. 3 ' Given
32
at the very least, reckless.1
This pressure to be "close" may cause severe discomfort to those involved. This is particularly true of outdoor programs, such as the Pecos River Project, that include therapy sessions or
intense personal discussions as part of the program. Unlike corporate retreats, cocktail parties
and company picnics, adventure programs demand far more contact and intimacy than is
usual at conventional company gatherings. It is possible to have a working relationship with
co-workers that does not involve deep friendship, and employees are entitled to make decisions about friendship on their own. See infra notes 181-93 and accompanying text (discussing forced intimacy as an invasion of privacy).
Employers and program operators show little concern about participants' psychological
well-being, perhaps because they believe that these programs are not likely to produce
psychological injuries. The case for intent is strengthened by the experimental nature of the
programs. Employers encourage employees to take part even though they are unfamiliar with
their emotional stability or background.
129. Givelber, supra note 95, at 46.
This view distinguishes between intention regarding the conduct and its likely victim, and intention regarding the consequences of the conduct. Plaintiff must show
that the defendant intended to engage in conduct that is outrageous and that he or
she intended or knew (or, perhaps, deliberately disregarded a high degree of probability) that the behavior would affect the plaintiff; once plaintiff has shown this, a
reasonableness standard will be applied with respect to the issue of whether the
defendant should have known that the conduct would cause emotional distress to
the plaintiff . . . . Thus formulated, the test supports liability in cases where the
defendant is so insensitive to the feelings of others that it is believable that the
defendant had no idea that his or her outrageous behavior towards plaintiff would
inflict severe emotional distress.
Id. at 46-47.
130. Id. at 46. See also Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 140-45, 355
N.E.2d 315, 318 (1976); Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974)
(noting that the intent or recklessness requirement was met when the defendant "had the
specific purpose of inflicting emotional distress or where he intended his specific conduct and
knew or should have known that emotional distress would likely result.'). By contrast, the
REsTATmENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 47 comment a, specifically requires that the defendant
intended to cause severe distress.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRis § 46 (1965).
132. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 comment i defines recklessness as "deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow." Given
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3. Defenses
As a defense, employers might argue that they do not require
employees to participate in these programs and that, therefore, any
employee who chooses to participate consents to do so. 133 Although
rarely raised in emotional distress cases, consent is a defense to this
and all other claims based on the commission of an intentional
tort.134 Consent usually means that the employees are able to make
a choice as to whether to participate in the adventure program without jeopardizing their futures with the employer. 3s But the coercion
implicit in a corporate decision to enroll managers in an adventure

the risks that these programs pose and the extensive knowledge that employers have about
them, sending employees on adventure programs should be regarded as deliberate disregard
within the meaning of the Restatement. See supra notes 32-84 and accompanying text.
133. Most managerial employees are not told that they must participate. Instead, the
employer tells them how important it is to the company and how the company strongly
"advises" them to go. As the earlier discussion indicated, managers usually get the message.
See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. If the employer requires managers to go, the
coercion is more obvious.
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOR[S, § 892A; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note

98, § 18 (noting that consent is rarely raised as a defense in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases because this defense is neither relevant nor plausible in many situations).
Plaintiffs rarely consent to the kind of treatment that they have received. In Rulon-Miller v.
IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984), the plaintiff obviously did not
consent to her termination under the circumstances of that case. See supra notes 105-10, and
accompanying text. In Bodewig v. K-Mart, Inc., 54 Or. App. 480, 635 P.2d 657 (1981), and
Hall v. May Dep't Stores Co., 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981), the plaintiffs did not
consent to being harassed, interrogated and searched in that way. See supra notes 113-23 and
accompanying text. See also, Ford v. Revlon, Inc, 153 Ariz. 38, 734 P.2d 580 (1987)
(noting that the company took no action when its supervisor sexually harassed an employee
for over a year); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co, 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976)
(noting that an employee was discharged as part of the employer's plan to fire employees in
alphabetical order until the employee who stole was uncovered); Milton v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 101 II. App. 3d 75, 427 N.E.2d 829 (1981) (noting that an employee was fired when
he refused to file false reports); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp, 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565
P.2d 1173 (1977) (involving an employee who was forced to endure racial harassment).
135. See, eg., PROSSER & KEMnON, supra note 98, § 18.

But consent is regarded as present, also, when one manifests a willingness that the
defendant engage in conduct and the defendant acts in response to such a manifestation .

. .

. [A] willingness to incur an invasion, or a willingness that the defen-

dant should engage in conduct that brings about an invasion, may exist and be
manifested only because the defendant has threatened consequences flowing from a
refusal to submit. Under such circumstances the plaintiff's submission or manifestation of willingness may be coerced.
Id. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text. In Bodewig, for example, the employer
claimed that the plaintiff was only asked, not told, to disrobe before the customer. The court
quickly disposed of this argument by stating that she had no choice because she feared
losing her job. 54 Or. App. at 485, 635 P2d at 660.
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program, and the limited information normally provided to employees
about these programs, suggest that consent may not be an effective
defense. 36
Most employees are not likely to feel that they can refuse to
participate in an adventure program even if given a choice, since
doing so may jeopardize their futures with the company. 37 Even if
refusal does not jeopardize the relationship with supervisors, other
employees who went through the program might resent their absence,
thereby damaging their relationships with co-workers and impeding
their future job performance. 38 Many operators of adventure programs are aware of the problem of coercion and of the risks that
employees might try exercises that they are unable to accomplish
without experiencing serious emotional distress. 3 9 Thus, some tell
employers not to send unwilling employees to the program, warn
employees that they need not try everything, and tell employers not
to use performance as part of its evaluation system. 4 ' But all that
these operators can do is to offer these suggestions. They have no
way to ensure that participation is truly voluntary; coercion is inherent in the command structure of a corporation. 1t
Even if employers advise employees that participation in an
adventure program is not required, the prospective participants may
lack the information necessary to make an informed decision. There is
little indication that participants know much about the exercises in the

136. The concept of "informed consent" has been applied primarily to medical procedures. Informed consent protects personal autonomy by requiring that patients know about and
consent to any medical procedures performed on them. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 98,
§ 18. A similar concern with personal autonomy exists with adventure programs that intensively probe participants' most private fears and attitudes in ways not dissimilar to psychotherapy, although without the privacy and safeguards associated with therapy. While there are
no reported cases involving adventure training and similar behavior-modification programs,
courts should scrutinize them with the same care as other medical and psychotherapeutic

procedures.
137. See Black, supra note 2.
138. A manager at Nike said as much about employees who did not go on the adventure
program promoted by the company. Mac Neil/Lehrer Newshour (WNET television broadcast,

Sept. 4, 1989).
139. Telephone interview with Bo Hughes, Personnel Director, North Carolina Outward

Bound (March 1, 1990); Telephone interview with Alison Stringer, Director of Rockpoint
Reach School, Burlington, Vt. (June 10, 1990); Telephone interview with John Donovan,
Donovan Associates, Norwich, Vt. (July 9, 1990).
140. Black, supra note 2, at 63.
141. Telephone interview with Alison Stringer, Director of the Rockpoint Reach School,
Burlington, Vt., (June 10, 1990). Telephone interview with John Donovan, Donovan Associates, Norwich, Vt. (July 9, 1990). See also Black, supra note 2, at 62.
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training course. 42 The adventure training literature rarely explains
the program in detail, and it is not even clear if participants see this
literature because much of it is written for the corporate employer. 43 In any case, the literature cannot convey to participants what
these exercises are really like.'" Thus, the first opportunity for an
employee to make an informed decision on participation in the program may be when the employee arrives at the training site. By this
time, however, the pressure for participation has increased substantially and employees may feel unable to refuse to participate.1 5 Adventure programs are designed to have group members encourage other
reluctant participants to become "team players," and to take the
risks." This pressure might well push participants to engage involuntarily in activities that they cannot manage, with devastating results.

147

Even if the employee can establish the elements of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, some states do not allow employees to

bring this tort action against the employer; rather, they must bring a
claim for psychological injury under workers' compensation
schemes."4 However, injured employees can bring a separate action
49
against the operators of the corporate adventure programs.
Workers' compensation would not be a bar to this suit.'s5 How well
142. See, e.g., Dingle, supra note 11, at 64 (discussing a Xerox employee who was not
told what to expect); The Wilderness Lab, supra note 2, at 60. The North Carolina Outward
Bound brochure tells participants to expect a rugged experience, but this brochure is not sent
to participants until they are already signed up for the course.
143. See, e.g., SportsMind brochure.
144. Only the supervisor knew anything about the exercises in the program that I observed. The other employees did not know what to expect. See supra note 23.
145. See Black, supra note 2, at 62-63.
146. Black, supra note 2, at 63.
147. Id. Some program operators warn employees that they do not have to participate in
every activity. However, in the presence of supervisors and co-workers, who are encouraging
the reluctant participant to overcome his or her fears and become a team player, the opportunity to decline participation in an activity is more theoretical than real. In the program that I
observed, the facilitator told participants that they did not have to participate in any exercise
that frightened them. However, the supervisor was present, and all the employees participated
even though they were frightened of doing so. See supra note 23.
148. See, e.g., Simmons v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co, 394 Mass. 1007, 476 N.E.2d 221
(1985); Hood v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Battista v.
Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982); Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass.
545, 413 N.E.2d 711 (1980). See also Austin, supra note 90, at 5 n.17; 2A A. LARsON, THe
LAW OF WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION § 68.34(a) (1987); North Carolina Outward Bound
brochure.
149. See, e.g., Hall v. Northwest Outward Bound School, Inc., 280 Or. 655, 572 P.2d
1007 (1977).
150. Injured employees are likely to sue any party responsible for the injury. In response,
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would such a claim against the operator fare? Unlike the employer,
the operator does not have power over participants. Employees participate because the employer told or "asked" them to do so. Even so,
there may be no reason to treat the operator differently. The operators
or consultants sell their programs to corporate leaders as ways to
transform employees.'
The operator and the employer normally
design the course together.'52 The operator depends on the employer
to deliver the participants. Although the authority operators have is
derived from the employer, this authority is still imbued with the

same potential for abuse as with the employer. Furthermore, the operator normally organizes and conducts the exercises. If operators of

outdoor programs work in the corporate setting, they ought to bear
the same risks and liability if a participant is emotionally harmed in
the process.5 3

many operators such as Outward Bound routinely include waiver of liability forms in the
materials sent to participants.
Courts are generally hostile to waiver of liability or disclaimer forms when plaintiffs
are personally injured, and where the plaintiffs do not understand the meaning of the disclaimer, or the risks involved. See, eg., Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 103, 400 N.E.2d 306
(1979). But see PROSSE3R & KEBrON, supra note 98, § 68.
As indicated earlier, employees rarely know much about adventure training programs
before they arrive. See supra notes 142-47, and accompanying text. In the program that I
observed at the Rockpoint Reach School, employees did not know what to expect. Their
supervisor did not tell them what to expect because he did not want to create any negative
preconceptions.
In the Fasules case mentioned earlier, see supra note 7, the defendant also tried to
introduce into evidence a release signed by the plaintiff. The federal district court refused to
allow the release into evidence because the circumstances under which the release was given
to participants on the rafting trip did not indicate that anyone understood the risks or dangers
involved. In addition, the release itself was "too broad and ambiguous" to give the plaintiff
any understanding of what the release meant or what dangers the river posed to novice
rafters. In another suit brought by the widow of Robert Goldstein, another executive who
died on the trip, the federal court also refused to admit this same release. Freeman, DDB
Needham Faces Chilko Trial Next Year, ADVERTISING AGE, July 9, 1990, at 4; Hume, supra
note 7, at 6; King & Hinge, supra note 7, at B4, col. 4-5. As in these cases, the court may
also decline to enforce a release or disclaimer if the plaintiff did not understand the risks
involved in the exercises or what the disclaimer meant.
151. See SportsMind brochure.
152. See Petrini, supra note 2, at 25; Wolman, Training Among the Trees, TRAININO
NEws, Dec. 1981, at 1, 3. The brochure from the Outward Bound School at Hurricane Island
in Maine contains the following:
The Team Leadership program is a contact course which focuses on team building
and leadership development. We would work closely with you to develop a result
focused program designed specifically to meet your needs. Programs range from 17 days in length based on the goals and objectives established with you.
See also Gall, supra note 14, at 55.
153. In the Fasules case, see supra note 7, the plaintiff did not sue the the rafting

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol19/iss3/4

26

Vogel: Manufacturing Solidarity: Adventure Training for Managers

1991]

ADVE

TURE TRAINING

B. Invasion of Privacy
Warren and Brandeis are generally credited as the first to advocate a cause of action for invasion of privacy S4 In their landmark
article of 1890, they argued that invasion of privacy should be treated
as a cause of action independent of trespass and other intentional
torts.155 Later, Prosser and the Restatement divided invasion of privacy into four distinct causes of action: (1) "unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of" individuals or their private affairs; 5 6 (2) appropriation of the name or likeness of another; 5 7 (3) public disclosure of private facts which "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person;"' 5 8 and (4) publicity that unreasonably places an individual "in a false light before the public."" 9 Because adventure programs may intrude into aspects of employees' lives unrelated to the
requirements of the job, intrusion upon seclusion is the privacy cause
of action most relevant to corporate adventure programs. '6

company that "ran the trip" because the rafting company was Canadian and because they
were uninsured. Telephone interview with Bruce Crowe, attorney for plaintiff Chicago, Illinois
(Jan. 26, 1991). Many operators of adventure programs do have insurance, so they are not
likely to avoid a lawsuit if an injury occurs.
A few companies operate their own outdoor training programs without the assistance
of adventure program operators. See Gall, supra note 14, at 57. In that instance, an injured
employee will not have an independent third party to sue.
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1965) (citing Warren & Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L REV. 193 (1890)).
155. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REV. 193 (1890).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 625A, 652B (1977); WORKPLACB PRIVACY,
supra note 86, at 25-30.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A, 652C (1977); WORKPLACE PRIVACY,
supra note 86, at 25-30; K. DECKER, EMPLOYER PRIVACY LAW AND PRACIICE § 43 (1987)

[hereinafter EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAw]; Decker, Employment Privacy Law for the 1990's, 15
PEPPRDINE L. REV. 551, 558-64, 570-73 (1988).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A, 652D (1977); WORKPLACE PRIVACY,
supra note 86, at 25-30; EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW, supra note 157, § 4.3; Decker, supra
note 157, at 558-64, 570-73.
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A, 652D (1977); WORKPLACE PRIVACY,
supra note 86, at 25-30; EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAw, supra note 157, § 43; Decker, supra
note 157, at 570-73.
160. The employee might bring another cause of action for publication of private facts if
the employer "publicizes" the performance of employees in these programs to a large number
of people. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). Public disclosure of
private facts is in fact the most common privacy claim brought in the employment setting.
See Decker, supra note 157, at 571. To be actionable, disclosure must be of private facts,
must be made at least to a large number of people or to the public at large, and must be
"highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities." PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 98, § 117. See infra notes 173-78 (discussing whether adventure
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1. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines intrusion upon seclusion as follows: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his [or her] private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person."161 There can be little doubt that the intrusions of corporate
adventure programs are intentional.162 Establishing that the intrusions
are highly offensive and that they invade a protected form of solitude
or privacy concerns may be more problematic. Although the case law
on privacy has not yet addressed corporate adventure programs, the
latter provide a unique opportunity to clarify what privacy rights exist
in the employment setting.
Apart from the phrase, "the right to be let alone," 163 there is

programs involve private facts). The requirement of public disclosure has limited the effectiveness of this cause of action in the employment setting. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORiS § 652D (1977), requires disclosure to the public at large. If disclosure occurs only to
a group of employees rather than to the public at large, courts may not find that there is
adequate publicity. Se, e.g., Hudson v. S.D. Warren Co., 608 F. Supp. 477 (D. Me. 1985)
(holding that disclosure to supervisors was not adequate disclosure); Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d
74 (Okla. 1986) (holding that disclosure of an employee's psychiatric problems and evaluation
to a limited number of co-workers was not public disclosure); Decker, supra note 157, at
571; Duffy, Pepe & Gross, Big Brother in the Workplace: Privacy Rights versus Employer
Needs, 9 INDUS. REL. J. 30, 38 (1987) [hereinafter Big Brother]. However, some courts
have relaxed the requirement of public disclosure. See, e.g., Keehr v. Consolidated FreightWays of Del., Inc., 825 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that there was an invasion of
privacy when a supervisor yelled insults about employee's spouse's sexual activities to coworkers); Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977) (holding summary
judgment inappropriate where an employer disclosed embarrassing information in a letter to
army officers and the civil service commission); Bratt v. IBM, 392 Mass. 508, 467 N.E.2d
126 (1984) (stating that revealing medical information to other supervisors may be actionable). If disclosure to coworkers is an adequate disclosure, then requiring employees to
expose their fear of heights or water to other employees may be actionable. See infra notes
173-78 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure in adventure programs). Apart from
exposure to co-workers, disclosure to a large number of people might occur if employees are
videotaped while performing the exercises and the tape is widely disseminated. At the adventure program I attended, the group facilitator recommended that the supervisor tape the
exercises and show it to others.
Some adventure programs are concerned about liability for disclosure. The North
Carolina Outward Bound School asks participants to sign a photo consent form so that the
school can use pictures and videos of the participants. See The North Carolina Outward
Bound brochure.
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
162. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (discussing intent).
163. T. COOLEY, TOR'TS 29 (2d ed. 1888); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 98, § 117.
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little agreement about the meaning of privacy. 1" In the employment
setting, most of the intrusion cases stem from information-gathering

and evaluation activities undertaken by the employer.165 Even for
these more traditional intrusions, there is disagreement about how
much latitude an employer should have in investigating and regulating
employee behavior.' 66
As one commentator explains, many employers engage in intrusive information-gathering practices in order to know the "whole
employee," what he or she can or does do on and off the job. 167 In
the privacy cases, employees have challenged the gathering of information on such matters as their financial affairs, off-duty recreational
activities, personal relationships, or sexual activities."6 In deciding

164. A full discussion of the meaning of privacy is beyond the scope of this article. 'The
right of privacy has produced a voluminous body of literature. Major works include: A.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE LJ. 475 (1968); Gavison,
Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE iJ.421 (1980); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 233 (1977); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34
(1967); Huff, Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH. L REV. 777 (1980); Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age The Challenge of a New Technology in an InformationOriented Society, 67 MICH. L REV. 1089 (1969); Posner, Privacy, Secrecy and Reputation,
28 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1979); Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978);
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L REv. 383 (1960).
165. These include drug testing, psychological testing, polygraphs, medical examinations
and questionnaires or other means of acquiring information about employees lives. See, eg.,
O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of Am, Inc., 780 F.2d 1167 (1st Cir. 1986) (polygraph testing); Cort
v. Bristol-Myers, Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982) (questionnaires); K-Mart Corp.
Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), writ refused, 686 S.W.2d
593 (1985) (search of employee's locker); Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976)
(opening personal mail); Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 66 Md. App. 133, 502 A.2d
1101, cert. deniea 306 Md. 289, 508 A2d 488, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984 (1986) (surveillance of employees out of the workplace). See generally EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW, supra
note 157; WORKPLACE PRIVACY, supra note 86.
166. See, eg., EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW, supra note 157; WORKPLACE PRIVACY, supra
note 86; Comment, Privacy and the Employment Relationship, 25 Hous. L REV. 289 (1988);
Duffy, Privacy v. Disclosure" Balancing Employee and Employer Rights, 7 EMPLOYEE REL
LJ. 594 (1982); Big Brother, supra note 160, at 30; Johnson, A Renewed Employee Right of
Privacy, 34 LAB. LJ. 747 (1983); Murg & Maledon, Privacy Legislation - Implications for
Employers, 3 EMPLOYEE REL LJ. 168 (1971); Comment, Employee Privacy Rights: A
Proposal,47 FORDHAM L. REV. 155 (1978); Comment, Rights of Employers to Use Personal
Information About Their Employees, 7 W. NEW ENG. L.REV. 337 (1984).
167. EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW, supra note 157, at 11.
168. See, eg., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir.
1983) (questioning employees about sexual relations with spouse); Slohoda v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc. 475 A.2d 618 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 504
A.2d 53 (NJ. 1986) (investigating employee's extramarital affair may constitute an invasion
of privacy); K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984),
writ refused; 686 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1985) (search of employee locker and handbag); Cort v.
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whether these information-gathering activities intrude upon protected
private affairs, the courts have focused on whether the employer has
delved into matters in which employees have a reasonable expectation
of privacy. 69 Employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy
regarding their persons, beliefs, property, personal relationships and
other off-work activities. 7 ° Nonetheless, such expectations may have
to yield to the legitimate requirements of the workplace.' The determination of whether the intrusion on employees' reasonable expectations of privacy is "offensive" usually turns on the extent to which
the intrusive activity is related to the legitimate concerns of the employer and on the means that the employer uses to accomplish these
2
7

ends.

Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982) (holding that a questionnaire that
asked about employee attitudes, weaknesses and finances was not an invasion of privacy).
169. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 98, § 117. For example, in Cort v. Bristol-Myers
Co, 385 Mass. at 306-10, 431 N.E.2d at 913-14, the plaintiffs, pharmaceutical salespersons,
refused to fill out certain questions on a questionnaire that they believed to be highly personal and generally irrelevant to their job responsibilities. As a result, they were fired. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that while requiring employees to supply unreasonably
intrusive information could invade their privacy, most of these questions were "relevant to the
plaintiffs' job qualifications." Id. at 310, 431 N.E.2d at 914.
The information that a high level or confidential employee should reasonably be
expected to disclose is broader in scope and more personal in nature than that
which should be expected from an employee who mows grass or empties waste
baskets. A salesman responsible for the sale of drug products to hospitals, doctors,
and pharmacists, falls in the middle of this range, but toward its upper side. The
temperament and dedication of a salesman are important factors in his effective.
ness, and questions bearing on these subjects are certainly reasonable and should
be expected.
Id. at 309, 413 N.E.2d at 913. See also Bratt v. IBM, 392 Mass. 508, 467 N.E.2d. 126

(1984).
Cort also found that the company did not invade the plaintiffs' privacy because they
had refused to answer the questions that they believed to be intrusive. If the employer was
unable to secure the information, the "attempted invasion of privacy . . . failed." .d. at 304,
431 N.E.2d at 910.

Employer actions may also create a greater expectation of privacy in the workplace
than might exist otherwise. For example, in Trotti, the employer allowed employees to supply

their own locks for store lockers without giving the employer the key or combination. 677
S.W.2d at 637-38. In so doing, the employer "recognized an expectation that the locker and
its contents would be free from intrusion and interference." Id. at 637. The employer violated
that expectation when it opened the locker and searched the employee's purse without her
permission. Id. at 637-38. See also Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 498, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 524 (1984) (noting that company policy protected the plaintiff's off-duty relationships

from intrusion).
170. Comment, Privacy and The Employment Relationship, 25 Hous. L. REv. 389, 394
(1988) [hereinafter Privacy and The Employment Relationship].
171. Id. at 397-98.
172. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 98, § 117. WORKPLACE PRIVACY, supra note 86, at

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol19/iss3/4

30

Vogel: Manufacturing Solidarity: Adventure Training for Managers

1991]

ADVENTURE TRANNG

The discussion of adventure programs in Section 113 suggests
that such programs may intrude into employees' private affairs or
concerns in two ways. First, corporate adventure programs may force
employees to reveal deep-seated fears and anxieties that, in the usual
work setting, are the personal and private concern of the employees.' 74 Second, the programs may force employees into forms of
intimacy that are normally associated with private decisionmaking.'"
Are these invasions justified? The premise of these exercises is that
participants will acquire new confidence to confront more conventional challenges by facing and overcoming these otherwise private fears
and anxieties. The revelation of private feelings inherent in these
exercises is compounded when employees who are too fearful to
attempt the exercises, or who fail while attempting them, experience
embarrassment and humiliation in front of co-workers. 176 While
there may be some employment situations in which it is unreasonable
for employees to expect that their fears and anxieties concerning
unusual physical challenges will remain private, 77 those would not
appear to include the typical management position. In most work
settings, managers do not have to admit to or confront their personal
fears about heights, water, boats or the outdoors. Moreover, forcing
employees to expose these fears may cause the kind of embarrassment
and trauma that almost anyone would want to keep private. Other coworkers and the employer might well interpret this behavior as a sign
of "weakness" or incompetence. Attempting to transform the attitudes
of employees this way makes these programs more like therapy sessions, an activity that ordinarily falls within a reasonable expectation
of privacy. 78

30.
173. See supra notes 41-62 and accompanying text.
174. This privacy concern falls within Alan Westin's definition of privacy as "the claim
of individuals . .. to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information

about them is communicated to others." A. WESUN, PRIVACY AND FREEDoM 7 (1967).
175. Although many cases concern physical intrusion, privacy protects an individual's
psychological well-being as well. PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 98, § 117.
176. Black, supra note 2, at 67.
177. There are some employment contexts in which employees may not reasonably expect
that certain phobias are their private concern alone - e.g., the airline pilot with a fear of
heights or the ship captain with a fear of water. However, even in the airline company, the
office manager should have a reasonable expectation that his or her fear of heights will
remain a private concern.

178. Certainly, information given in the context of psychotherapeutic situations is considered "private" in the way that the term is usually meant. See, eg., Bratt v. IBM, 392 Mass.
508, 467 N.E.2d 126 (1984) (noting that a doctor told the supervisor that an employee was
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The employer may well see the program as a way to discover
who will "break" under pressure or stress. But it does so by means
that are so broad that courts should find them offensive intrusions.
Fears of falling or drowning have little to do with the job requirements of managers. An individual who displays diffidence about
rappelling down a steep cliff may nevertheless be an excellent administrator or executive.
Employers might maintain that adventure programs increase a
manager's ability and willingness to learn in new places and under
less than ideal circumstances. After experiencing the adventure program, it might be argued, managers should be able to handle anything
that the corporation needs for them to do in the fast-changing business world. 9 Yet, like the other claims discussed above, this relationship between adventure programs and managerial duties has not
been established." s If employers choose to rely on these claims to
justify intrusions into employee privacy, they must offer stronger
evidence of the connection than the unsubstantiated assertions of program brochures. 8 ' Absent such evidence, intruding on employees'
emotional privacy should be considered "offensive" within the meaning of the tort.
The second serious privacy concern with corporate adventure
programs is that they put employees through risk-taking and teambuilding physical exercises, purportedly to "bond" them more closely
together in order to increase corporate loyalty, efficiency and productivity. This "bonding" process is designed to go well beyond the
polite working relationships accomplished in quality work circles or
other kinds of workplace teams. 8 2 Corporate adventure programs

paranoid and needed to see a psychiatrist).
179. See supra notes 13-40 and accompanying text.
180. In a limited category of employment contexts, a training program that exposes or
helps to overcome certain phobias may be obviously and directly related to the employe's
job responsibilities. See supra note 177.
181. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
182. Quality work circles are small work teams composed of management and workers
who meet to "formulate solutions to production or service problems that fall within the scope
of the group's work." Ferguson & Gaal, Codetermination: A Fad or a Future in America?,
10 EMPLOYEE REL L.J. 176, 181 (1985). The functions of such groups vary anywhere from
merely discussing the "technical concerns of production," id., to actually organizing and
controlling part of the production process. WEILER, supra note 12, at 31-32. While Japanese
companies did not invent these groups, larger companies use quality work circles extensively.
See OUCHI, supra note 70, at 39-55; TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY, supra note 70, at 12-13, 1819, 58-59, 87-89, 102-03, 119-20, 143-44; Kuper, Developments in the Quality of Working
Life, 28 LAB. Li. 752 (1977); The New Industrial Relations, Bus. WK., May 11, 1981, at
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seek to create deep bonds of friendship by putting employees into
situations designed to foster vulnerability and deep camaraderie, the

kind of intimate relationship employees would not necessarily choose
to create on their own.8 3 At a minimum, this sort of "forced intimacy"" violates the right of employees to choose their own relationships and friendships."s
Although this argument has not been specifically made in the

intrusion cases, some decisions provide authority for the proposition
that employers cannot force employees into close relationships. For
example, in Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc.,1' the
Eleventh Circuit found that the employer wrongfully intruded on the

solitude of the plaintiff by sexually harassing her continually for
several months. 7 The employer locked fthe employee in his office,
questioned her about her sex life with ler husband, and finally dis-

84; Pascarella, 'QWL" Is Slowly Proving to Be a Wnner, INDUS. WL, Sept. 21, 1981, at 17;
Verma & McKersie, Employee Involvement: The Implications of Noninvolvement by Unions,
40 INDUS. & LAB. R. REv. 556 (1987).
For a more critical view of quality work circles' and other forms of employee involvement, see R. LEVERtNG, A GREAT PLACE TO WORK 21, 87, 116, 152-53 (1988); M. PARKER,
INSIDE TlE CIRCLE: A UNION GUIDE TO QWL (1985); WEILER, supra note 12, at 31-37,
191-93, 205-24; Banks & Metzgar, Participating in Management: Union Organizing on a
New Terrain, 14 LAB. RES. REV. 1 (1989); Bluestone, Goodbye to the Management Rights
Clause, 14 LAB. RES. REv. 66 (1989); Ferguson & Gaal, supra note 182; Klare, The LaborManagement Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 39 (1988); Kohler, Models of Worker Participation:The Uncertain Significance of
Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499 (1986); Parker & Slaughter, Dealing With Good Management, 14 LAB. RES. REv. 73 (1989).
183. Of course, individual employees may become friends with other employees, but
these friendships are made on their own, not at the employer's initiation. While the
*workplace is a major place where social relationships are formed, these programs are designed to control employee decision-making in this regard.
184. See supra notes 59-62.
185. Many employees would find it difficult to stand aloof from the pressure to bond
with the other participants because the intensity of the experience is likely to make him or
her feel uncomfortable. In the program that I observed, most employees felt they had to do
the exercises, especially the team-building exercises, even if they were uncomfortable with the
intimacy and the physical contact involved. For one thing, the supervisor was there participating and watching what the others were doing. For another, the facilitators made it hard for
any member of the group to stand aside. In any case, employers and co-workers might well
regard such reticence as antisocial and would not consider the individual a "team player" or
a good prospect for promotion.
186. 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983). The portion of the opinion dealing with invasion
of privacy under Alabama law was written by the Alabama Supreme Court. The Eleventh
Circuit certified the state law questions to the Alabama Supreme Court. Its answer comprised
that part of the Eleventh Circuit opinion. 711 F.2d at 1533-37.
187. Id. at 1526-28.
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missed her after she refused his sexual advances." 8 In addition to
finding a violation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Eleventh Circuit found that these activities invaded her privacy under state

law even though the employer was not successful in getting his
way.' 89 The mere use of the employer's power to corner and harass
her with obscene suggestions and demands was enough for liability.'
Although adventure programs do not include sexual harassment of this type, Phillips suggests that an employer cannot force

employees into relationships more intimate than a working relationship. Insisting that employees "bond" during an adventure program,
while not as humiliating as sexual harassment, can be just as intrusive, and it would not be surprising for a court to find liability based
on that behavior.' 91
While the tort cases do not expressly address the matter, a zone
of protected privacy is defined not only by the exclusion of those
who would intrude, but also by an individual's right to make decisions without interference. 92 Most employment cases stress limits

188. Id.
189. Id. at 1533-34. But see Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908
(1982) (finding no invasion of privacy when an employee did not answer intrusive questions
on the employer's questionnaire).
190. The analysis in Phillips could be important if, for example, an employee refused to
go on the outdoor program, or if the employee went but did not participate in the "offensive" exercises. In these instances, the employee could still bring a privacy action if the
employer kept insisting that the employee participate. See Phillips, 711 F2d at 1534.
191. In a related case, a New Jersey court found that an employer may be liable under
the tort of intrusion when it had pressured employees to terminate intimate relationships with
others of whom the employer disapproved. In Slohoda v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 193 NJ.
Super. 586, 475 A.2d 618 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 207 NJ. Super. 145, 504 A.2d 53
(1986), the employer fired a married employee who was having an affair with a female
employee who was not his wife. The employer stated that the primary reason for the discharge was that the plaintiff was having an adulterous affair. 193 NJ. Super. at 586, 588-92,
475 A.2d at 618, 619-20. In finding that the "discharge policy" may have violated the
employer's "right to privacy," id. at 593, 475 A.2d at 622, Slohoda suggests that the employer cannot regulate the sexual or intimate activities of employees absent a legitimate business
concern about how these relationships may affect the proper functioning of the workplace. Id.
at 592-93, 475 A.2d at 621-22. The employer might be concerned about liability under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-e to 2000-e.17 (1982), for sexual harassment
if supervisors have relationships with employees. See Mertor Says. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986) (noting that the mere existence of a grievance procedure will not shield
the employer from liability under Title VII where the employer's agent made unwelcome
sexual advances).
192. It is far more common to see discussions of the individual's right to make such
decisions in the constitutional privacy cases. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (holding that a state may not intrude on the marital relationship by banning the use
of contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the constitutional
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on employer conduct without mention'of employees' affirmative right
to make decisions about their private lives. Discussions about the
importance of employee autonomy in or outside of the workplace are
less common, perhaps because courts are more concerned with limiting or preserving the employer's control over the workplace.'9 3 Yet
employee autonomy should mean, at a minimum, that employees are
able to prevent exposure of their deepest fears and anxieties to their
employers if such fears have no direct relationship to their ability to
perform their work. Similarly, employees should have the right to

extend or withhold friendship or other intimate relationships with
other employees as they choose. The common law right to privacy
should protect the employee's right to make these decisions without
undue interference by the employer.
2. Defenses
While courts recognize a right to privacy, they also recognize

certain defenses that, if interpreted broadly, may defeat a privacy
cause of action. As with intentional infliction, consent is a defense to
invasion of privacy.' 4 The case law tends to interpret consent
broadly. Some cases have found consent when the employer has

announced that it was implementing the program as a policy. If the
employee continues to work for the employer, he or she is thereafter
deemed to have consented to the policy." Courts have used this
approach to uphold such employment practices as drug or polygraph
testing.' Thus, all the employer would need to do to establish con-

right of privacy prohibits government intrusion into access to contraceptives); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right of privacy extends to a woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy).
193. Courts never question the legitimacy of employer control over the workplace; they
question only how far that control can go. See generally Austin, supra note 91.
194. WORKPLACE PRIVACY, supra note 86, at 30; EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW, supra note
157, § 4.3. Prosser and Keeton argue that if the plaintiff consents, then there is no offensive invasion in the first instance. PROSSER & KEErON supra note 98, § 117-18.
195. Se ,-g.,
Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that implied consent occurred when an employee continued to work after a
drug program began); Texas Employment Comm'n v. Hughes Drilling Fluids, 746 S.W2d
796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that continuing to work after the employer announced the
drug testing program amounted to acceptance of the terms and provisions of the policy). But
see O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of Am., Inc, 780 F.2d 1067, 1072-73 (1st Cir. 1986) (refusing
to overturn the jury's verdict and finding that the plaintiff was coerced into taking a polygraph test); WORKPLACE PRIVACY, supra note 86, at 72-73.
196. See supra note 195; WORKPLACE PRIVACY, supra note 86, at 72-73, 98-101. See
also A. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 185-86 (1971) (arguing that "[tlo talk of information
being 'voluntarily' given in the context of . . . an employment relationship . . . is to ignore
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sent is to tell prospective or existing employees that it expects all of
its managers to undergo adventure training as part of its training and
evaluation process. For all of the reasons given earlier, consent is not
a real option for most job applicants or employees. 97 Having to
choose between taking or continuing in a job and going through an
adventure program, and losing a job or a promotion for refusal to do
so, is at best a hollow choice. Many of the privacy cases ignore this
reality. Even if the employer does not say that participation in the
program is required, most employees will feel that they cannot refuse. 9 ' Consent in this context is a fiction.199
One reason courts may interpret consent this broadly is because
they believe that the employer's practice is necessary to further legitireality.'); Hermann, Privacy, The Prospective Employee, and Employment Testing: The Nced
to Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L REV. 73, 111 (1971).

197. See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
198. But see Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989):
Jennings's employer threatens no unlawful invasion of any employee's privacy
interest; therefore it threatens no act contrary to the public policy underlying the
common-law right of privacy. The company's plan contemplates, rather, that an
employee's urine will be taken and tested only if he consents. The plan therefore
assumes, respects, and depends upon the central element of the right of privacy
and its attendant public policy: the individual's exclusive right to determine the
occasion, extent, and conditions under which he will disclose his private affairs to
others. This consensual predicate to any test reduces Jennings's argument to her
remaining contention.
Jennings contends finally that she is poor and needs her salary to maintain
herself and her family. Consequently, any "consent" she may give, in submitting to
urinalysis, will be illusory and not real. For that practical reason, she argues, the
company's plan does threaten a non-consensual, and therefore unlawful, invasion of
her privacy. We disagree with the theory. A competent person's legal rights and
obligations, under the common law governing the making, interpretation, and enforcement of contracts, cannot vary according to his economic circumstances. There
cannot be one law of contracts for the rich and another for the poor. We cannot
imagine a theory more at war with the basic assumptions held by society and its
law. Nothing would introduce greater disorder into both. Because Jennings may not
be denied the legal rights others have under the common law of contracts, she
may not be given greater rights than they. The law views her economic circumstances as neutral and irrelevant facts insofar as her contracts are concerned.
Id. at 502 (emphasis in original). Cf. Rothstein, Screening Workers for Drugs: A Legal and
Ethical Framewor, 11 EMpLoYEs REL. LJ. 422, 433 (1986) (noting that actions for invasion

of privacy by private sector employees are unlikely to be successful because the employee is
under no compulsion to submit to the test even though refusal might mean discharge).
199. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 98, § 117; WORKPLACE PRIVACY, supra note 86, at

30. Employees might be able to show lack of consent if they can show that the employer
did not really explain what adventure training entails or if they can show that the physical
and psychological demands of the training went far beyond what they had been led to
expect. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 892A (1977).
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mate business goals, even if this practice would be unacceptably
intrusive in any other setting m° For example, in the drug testing
cases, courts generally find that the employer has a legitimate concern
that employees not be intoxicated or impaired on the job. So long as
the manner of conducting a drug test is not more intrusive than is required and so long as the employee is on notice that such a test is
required, courts generally find that the employer has not invaded the
employee's privacyo l While concern over intoxication has some
connection to an employee's job, adventure training has much less. In
the absence of such a connection, the employer should not be able to
defend these programs simply by alleging that adventure programs
improve productivity and efficiency. Employers should have to demonstrate that these programs further legitimate goals. 2 The kind of
anecdotal information found in the literature should not suffice.0 3 In
addition, employers should also have to prove
that they could not
4
means.
intrusive
less
with
goals
such
achieve
Much of what has been said about the liability of employers
under the tort of intrusion should apply as well to operators of adventure programs. If, as I have urged, these programs invade employees'
privacy, operators should share this liability. In general, proponents of
adventure programs show little, if any, sensitivity about the intrusiveness of the exercises that they devise and market. 5 Because opera200. Furthering legitimate business goals is considered a defense or privilege to invasion
of privacy. Like consent, this defense could significantly reduce any protection available to
employees if interpreted too broadly. To some extent, this defense overlaps with the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the intrusion was "offensive to reasonable persons."
PROSSER & KEETON supra note 98, § 117; see also WORKPLACE PRIVACY, supra note 86, at
30. Presumably, if the intrusion furthered legitimate business goals, then it is not offensive to
reasonable persons. When courts find that the employer's practices furthered legitimate goals,
they are also saying that the practice is not offensive.
201. See supra note 195.
202. See Texas Employment Comm'n v. Hughes Drilling Fluids, 746 S.W.2d 796, 802
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that a violation of unreasonable rules promulgated by an
employer cannot constitute employee misconduct).
203. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
204. For a discussion of what reasonable drug testing methods should be, see EMPLOYEE
PRIVACY LAW, supra note 157, § 7.9.
Due, in part, to the inadequacies of tort law, nine states have passed legislation
regulating the use and administration of drug tests. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51t51bb (West 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.5 (West 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 683 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.950-57 (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-304 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1903 to -1909 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 286.5-1-2 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-1-15 (1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 511-20

(1987).
205. In my discussions with directors and group facilitators, none saw any serious
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tors do not have the same concern about productivity and efficiency
that employers have, courts may be less inclined to protect the operators from invasion of privacy claims especially when operators are
unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of the programs that they promote to employers.2°6
C. Wrongful Discharge
Employees may also have a cause of action if they are discharged or pressured to resign as a result of participating or refusing
to participate in an adventure program. 2 7 In recent years, many jurisdictions have modified the harsh employment-at-will doctrine,
which precluded judicial intervention in most employment terminations.2° The classic statement of the employment-at-will doctrine

problems with the risk-taking or team-building exercises. They viewed every problem as
solvable by telling employers not to force employees to attend or by telling participants that
they do not have to take part in exercises that bother them. These precautions ignore the
realities of choice in the workplace and the realities of the very group process that these programs are designed to encourage. Few employees feel that they can refuse to come, and even
fewer feel able to refuse to participate in exercises when other employees do.
206. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
207. Creating intolerable working conditions so that an employee is forced to resign is
called constructive discharge. Constructive discharge has long been held actionable under Title
VII and other federal labor statutes. See, e.g., Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170
(10th Cir. 1982); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. School Dist., 644 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1981);
Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 1279 (8th Cir. 1980); Muller v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); J.P. Stevens & Co.
v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 339 F.2d 203,

204 (6th Cir. 1964).
Constructive discharge has also been recognized in state wrongful discharge cases. See,
e.g., Smith v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 196 Cal. App. 3d 503, 241 Cal. Rptr. 916
(1987); Wagner v. Sanders Assocs., 638 F. Supp. 742 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Beye v. Bureau of
Nat'l Affairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 477 A.2d 1197, cert. denied, 301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274
(1984). See also I. SHEPHARD, P. HEYLMAN & R. DUSTON, WITHOUT JUST CAUSE 220-21
(1989) [hereinafter WiTHOUT JUST CAUSE].
208. For example, most states recognize the public policy exception to the at-will rule.
See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988); Williams v.
Hillhaven Corp., 91 N.C. App. 35, 370 S.E.2d 423 (1988); Johnson v. McDonnell-Douglas
Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988); Cummings v. EG&G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134
(D.R.I. 1988); Brumbaugh v. Ralston Purina Co., 656 F. Supp. 582 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (narrow
exception); Freidrichs v. W. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 410 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
Gordon v. Tenneco Retail Servs., 666 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (possible exception);
Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd., 226 Neb. 899, 416 N.W. 2d 510 (1987); Pierce v.
Franklin Elec. Co., 737 P.2d 921 (Okla. 1987) (possible exception); Knight v. Am. Guard &
Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1986) (narrow exception); Crawford v. David Shapiro &
Co., 490 So. 2d 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 1986) (very narrow exception); Heller v. Dover
Warehouse Mkt., Inc., 515 A.2d 178 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); Payne v. Rozendaal, 147 Vt.
488, 520 A.2d 586 (1986); Williams v. Killough, 474 So. 2d 680 (Ala. 1985) (very narrow
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allowed the employer to terminate the employee for any or no reason.' Only employees covered by collective bargaining agreements
or other contracts for a specific term could demand that they be
discharged for "just cause."21 0 In response to changing attitudes
about the employment relationship and a growing body of statutory
law limiting employer discretion, courts began to fashion various
common law doctrines to limit discharge in a number of situa-

exception); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985);
Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985); Watassek v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health,
143 Mich. App. 556, 372 N.W.2d 617 (1985); Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 283 S.C. 155, 321 S.E.2d 602 (1985); Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va.
534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985); Sabine Pilot Serv. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985);
Corbin v. Sinclair Mktg, Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Larrabee v. Penobscot
Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984) (possible exception); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100
Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984); Wadeson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 367
(N.D. 1984); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984);
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W. 2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,
113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983); Parnar v. American Hotel, Inc., 65 Haw. 370,
652 P.2d 625 (1982); Murphy v. Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Lab. Servs., 6 Kan. App.
2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Adler v. American Standard Corp, 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464
(1981), affd in part, rev'd in par 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987); Gram v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179
Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 NJ. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Kelsay v. Motorola,
Inc., 74 11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 Wash. 116,
246 S.E2d 270 (1978); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54
(1977); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or, 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co, 114
N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d
174 (1974); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973);
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959);
WiTHOUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 207, at Appendix A.
209. See, e.g, Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1980); Henry v. Pittsburgh &
LE.R. Co., 139 Pa. 289, 21 A. 157 (1891).
The at-will rule did not develop from the case law in the mid-nineteenth century. In
essence, Horace Wood invented the rule in his treatise on employment relations in 1877. E.H.
WOOD, LAW OF MASTER-SERVANT (1877). The rule was then widely accepted in the United
States. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118 (1976). See also Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L REv. 1404 (1967); Krauskopf, Employment Discharge Survey and Critique of the Modern At Will Rule 51 UMKC L. REV. 189,
189-93 (1983); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980) (cited to in Note, Protecting
Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L
REv. 1931 (1983) [hereinafter The Public Policy ExceptionD; Summers, The Contract of
Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at
Will, 52 FORDHAM L REV. 1082, 1082-87 (1984); WrrHOUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 207, at
15-19.
210. See supra note 209.
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tionsY1 As with invasion of privacy, wrongful discharge actually
comprises several causes of action sounding in both tort and contract.
These include: (1) discharge in violation of public policy;2 12
(2) implied and express contracts;2 13 and (3) the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. 214
1. Public Policy
Most jurisdictions recognize a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine, but its scope varies from state to
state. 2 5- Some jurisdictions interpret public policy narrowly; the discharge must violate or impinge on a statute, constitutional provision
or judicially created rule in order to violate public policy. 216 Other
jurisdictions do not restrict public policy so stringently, but are unclear as to the boundaries of the concept.217 However, even in jurisdictions that interpret the concept broadly, the employer's conduct
must affect more than the employee's interest or*concerns for the discharge to violate public policy.1 8

211. See WmTHouT JUST CAUSE, supra note 207, at 18-20.
212. See infra notes 215-72 and accompanying text.
213. See infra notes 273-328 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 270-358 and accompanying text.
215. See infra note 235; WrntOUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 207, at 27-63.
216. See, eg., WITHouT JUST CAUSE, supra note 207, at 27-58; The Public Ploicy
Exceition, supra note 209, at 1932, 1936-37; Krauskopf; supra note 209, at 235, 249-51.
217. Se- eg., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Il. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876,
878 (1981):
But what constitutes clearly mandated public policy? There is no precise definition
of the term. In general, it can be said that public policy concerns what is right
and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively. It is to be found in
the State's constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions.
The Illinois Supreme Court then found that the discharge violated public policy when
the employer fired the plaintiff; who had supplied information to, and cooperated with, local
law enforcement officials. Id. at 879. Even though no statute or constitutional provision
required what the employee did, nonetheless, the court found that a citizen's "exposure of
crime" and cooperation with law enforcement was a matter of public policy. Law enforcement
cannot function without citizen participation. Public policy is not limited to statutory and
constitutional provisions. Id. at 880. See also Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d

167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Payne v. Rozendaal, 147 Vt. 488, 520 A.2d

586 (1986).

218. One commentator was very critical of court attempts to distinguish the "private"
interests of employees from the interests of the public at large. See The Public Policy
Exception, supra note 209, at 1947-50. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
Most public policy cases fall into one of three categories: (1) refusal to engage in
criminal activity. See, eg., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (refusal to engage in price-fixing); (2) exercising a statutory or
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The one public policy case most relevant to adventure programs,
2 9
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital,
" was analyzed in

terms of violation of the state's indecency statutes. In Wagenseller,
the plaintiff, a nurse, went on an eight-day camping and rafting trip
down the Colorado River with a group consisting largely of hospital
co-workers and her immediate supervisor.' During the trip, she became uncomfortable with group pressure to engage in public urination, bathing, heavy drinking, and other similar activities." She refused to participate in these activities and in a group parody of
"Moon River," during which participants exposed themselves to others.' Her supervisor and other members of the group did this skit
twice, and each time the plaintiff refused to participate. 22 As a result of her refusal, she was harassed by her supervisor until she was
asked to resign.2" Before the trip, her job evaluations had been
very good.' Thereafter, her supervisor constantly criticized her
work.L 6 When she refused to resign, she was fired."7
The Arizona Supreme Court held that the discharge would be
contrary to public policy if the employee was fired for refusing to
participate in activities that would violate Arizona's indecent exposure
statute.m Although the Arizona Supreme Court did not limit the
definition of public policy to violation of criminal or other statutes, it
had little trouble finding that this discharge could have contravened

constitutional right. See, eg., Frampton v. Central Ind. Ins. Co, 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d
425 (1973) (filing a worker's compensation claim); or (3) performing a public duty. See, eg.,
Petrick v. Monarch Printing Corp., 111 I1I. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982) (reporting
suspicions of embezzlement to a superior); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I1. 2d
124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (cooperating with law enforcement); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 84 NJ. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (raising ethical objections to experimental
human research).
Discharge as a result of corporate adventure programs does not fit easily into any of
these categories. If courts are willing to recognize public policy in the violation of such
independent torts as intentional infliction of emotional distress or invasion of privacy, then
this kind of public policy is akin to exercising statutory rights. Employees are exercising their
right to avoid an invasion of privacy or emotional distress.
219. 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985).
220. Id. at 374, 710 P.2d at 1029.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 379-80, 710 P.2d at 1035-36.
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public policy where a criminal statute was involved. 9
Although most adventure programs do not violate criminal statutes as in Wagenseller, they still use the coercion inherent in the
employment relationship to pressure employees to engage in exercises
that have the same potential to humiliate them. 230 The supervisor in
Wagenseller saw the public participation in intimate activities as a
way of bonding employees with each other." She also viewed the
plaintiff's unwillingness to participate as an indication that she was
not a team player and, therefore, not a good employee. 2 While the
employer - a hospital - did not organize the rafting trip, it failed
to protect the employee from her supervisor when she returned to the
workplace? 3 Obviously, nothing she was asked to do on that trip
had much relevance to her job as an emergency room nurse.
Even in the absence of a pertinent criminal statute, an employee
discharged because of an adventure program could allege that the
discharge violated public policy under two circumstances. First, the
program might violate the common law tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and/or invasion of privacy in a manner discussed
earlier. 4 Even jurisdictions that interpret public policy narrowly
recognize judicial decisions as a source of public policy. 235 Of
course, the employee may not be able to make this argument if the
employer has not committed an independent tort such as, for example,

229. Id. at 378, 710 P.2d at 1033.
230. Black, supra note 2, at 63.
231. See Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 374-75, 710 P.2d at 1029-30.

232. Id.
233. Id. at 374, 710 P.2d at 1029. The plaintiff appealed her dismissal to higher authorities at the hospital but this appeal was denied. Id. at 374, 710 P.2d at 1029.
234. See supra notes 88-206 and accompanying text.
235. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1131-32 (Alaska 1989);
Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 378-79, 710 P.2d at 1033-34; Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 85 I11.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 NJ.
58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219,
232, 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (1984).
Public policy is usually defined by the political branches of government. Something
"against public policy" is something that the Legislature has forbidden. But the
Legislature is not the only source of public policy. In common-law jurisdictions,
courts too have been sources of law, always subject to legislative correction, and
with progressively less freedom as legislation occupies a given field. It is the
courts, to give one example, that originated the whole doctrine that certain kinds
of businesses - common carriers and innkeepers - must serve the public without
discrimination or preference. In this sense, then, courts make law, and they have
done so for years.
Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984).
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when the employee is fired for refusing to go."
For example, in Slohoda v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 7 the
employee alleged that he was dismissed because he had an extramarital affair with a co-worker. 8 The New Jersey Superior Court
held that if the employer's policy invaded the plaintiff's privacy, then
the discharge would be in violation of public policy as embodied in
the common law tort of invasion of privacy. 239 If the employer fired
the employee for reasons and under circumstances that create liability
under this tort, then, in addition to liability under the tort of invasion
of privacy,
the discharge would also be in violation of public poli240
cy.
If the employer's conduct creates liability for invasion of privacy
or intentional infliction of emotional distress, why does it matter if
the employer is liable for a discharge in violation of public policy?
Although the employee may not receive greater damages for a tortious discharge, nonetheless, liability sends an important message to
employers in ways that other tort liability may not. Unlike invasion
of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, this tort is
expressly directed at the employer. Wrongful discharge tells the employer that it cannot discharge employees for this reason even if it
has the power to do so ordinarily.
In the absence of, or in addition to, an independent tort, the
employee may be able to use state constitutional provisions that extend the right of privacy to private as well as public employees.
Some states have expansive privacy provisions in their state constitutions.2" For example, the California Constitution contains such a

236. Unless merely asking or requiring an employee to go is an invasion of his or her
privacy. See, e-g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Serv., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1534 (11th
Cir. 1983) (noting that intrusion upon privacy does not require "that [the] information be

acquired.').
237. 193 NJ. Super. 586, 475 A.2d 618 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 207 NJ. Super.

145, 504 A.2d 53 (1986), petition for certification denied, 104 N.J. 400, 517 A.2d 403
(1986).
238. Id. at 589, 475 A,2d at 619-20.
239. Id. at 590-91, 475 A.2d at 621-22.
240. Although many cases say decisional law can be the basis for public policy, few
cases have actually found decisional law as a basis for public policy. See supra note 235.
See also Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982) (noting that an
employer would contravene public policy if an employee were fired for refusing to answer
questions that unreasonably invaded his or her privacy).
241. See, eg., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; CAUF. CoNsT. art. I, § 1; IL. CoNsT. art.
1, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. Thus far, only the California courts have interpreted the
privacy provision to cover private employees. See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d
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provision.5 2 Although California courts are divided over the extent
of this protection, they have interpreted this provision to cover some
nongovernmental action.243 In Senmore v. Pool,2" the plaintiff was
terminated after refusing to take a "pupillary reaction eye test" for
drugsUS The California Court of Appeal held that the California6
24
Constitution's privacy provision covers private employers' actions,
As the court explained, the plaintiff's right to refuse to take a drug
test does not simply affect the employee alone.
While rights are won and lost by individual actions of people, the
assertion of the right establishes it and benefits all Californians in
the same way that an assertion of a free speech right benefits all of
us .... The dispute here is more than a dispute between Mr.
Semore and Kerr-McGee. It is a dispute over the role of drug testing in the workplace. 2 "
The court held that a constitutional claim to a right of privacy was
sufficient to raise an issue about whether this discharge was in violation of public policy.24 9 The court remanded the case to the trial
court to decide if Kerr-McGee's drug-testing program invaded this
employee's privacy as protected by the California Constitution.5
By contrast, in Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,2
another California Court of Appeal found that the right to privacy,
even if protected by the California Constitution, could not provide the
basis for a public policy exception to employment-at-will.5 2 Privacy, the court asserted, is a private, not a public, right.2s3 Because

222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). See EMPLOYEE PRIvAcY LAW, supra note 157, §§ 3.9-3.11.
242. CAL- CONST. art. I, § 1 states that "[a]ll people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquir-

ing possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and
privacy." See Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618,
cert. denied; 111 S. Ct. 344 (1990).
243. Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 1093, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (1990).

244. Id. at 1087, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
245. Id. at 1091, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1097, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 286.

248. Id. at 1097, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 285-86.
249. Id. at 1092, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
250. Id. at 1097, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 286. Deciding if the drug test at issue violated the
employee's right to privacy requires a balancing test weighing such employer's interest in
keeping out drugs with the intrusiveness of the test.
251. 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1990).
252. Id. at 28, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 635.

253. Id.
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the employer and employees can contractually agree that employees

should take drug tests "without violating any public interest,"

4

an

agreement between the plaintiff and defendant would not violate public policy.' In any case, public policy exists only when "reasonable persons can have little disagreement." 56 There is no consensus
on whether drug testing violates state and federal privacy
protections. 257 In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 258 the California
Supreme Court also required that public policy be "firmly established
at the time of termination." 259 At the time the defendant introduced
2
its drug testing program, no such rulings on drug testing existed.
Although the court upheld the jury's determination that the employer
violated the employee's right of privacy under the California Constitu-

tion, the court still refused to find that the employee's termination
violated public policy. 26'

Thus, even if employees establish that a state constitutional pro-

254. Id.
255. Id. Much of this argument comes from Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d
654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, (1988), where the California Supreme Court narrowed
the wrongful discharge case law. On the public policy exception, the court held that reporting
a supervisor's imminent indictment on embezzlement charges did not constitute public policy

because the information "serve[d] only the private interest of the employee," not the public at
large. Id. at 671, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
256. 218 Cal. App. 3d at 28, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
257. Id. at 29, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
258. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
259. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 29, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618,
635, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 344 (1990) (citing Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 668, 765 P.2d at 373,
254 Cal. Rptr. at 211).
260. Id. at 29, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
261. What is odd about the court's analysis is that it found that the employer acted in
bad faith by requiring the plaintiff to take a drug test when the employer could not justify
the program under the compelling interest test required by the California Constitution. The
plaintiff, a computer operator, did not have a job where impairment would create safety
hazards to the public or to other employees. That was the rationale the employer used to
require a urine test, a very intrusive test. 218 Cal. App. 3d at 19-24, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 62932. By terminating the plaintiff for her refusal to submit to urinalysis, the employer had
acted in bad faith because the employee was "exercising her constitutional right to privacy."
Id. at 26, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 633. The employer's "invasion . . . of privacy was unjustified."
Id. at 25, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
If the plaintiff had a constitutional right to refuse to undergo urinalysis, it makes little
sense to say that her discharge was not in violation of public policy. Perhaps the court was
afraid that interpreting public policy broadly would substantially increase the number of cases.
But see Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc, 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989), in which the
Alaska Supreme Court refused to interpret the state constitutional provision as covering
private action, but would allow this same constitutional provision to be the basis of a public
policy challenge in the event of discharge. ld. at 1130, 1132-33.
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vision covers the action of private employers, courts may not be
willing to find that their discharge violates public policy. Senmore
shows that courts will balance an employee's expectation of privacy
with the employer's need to regulate employees' conduct. 62 The
results of such a balancing test regarding adventure programs depend
on how much deference courts give to the employer's arguments that
such training programs are necessary to its business operations.
Senmore and Luck suggest that the examination of the employer's
justification is more stringent under a state constitution than is employed under the tort of invasion of privacy.6 3 In particular, the
court examines the intrusiveness of the employment practice and
questions its importance to the business. For the reasons given earlier,
adventure programs should not withstand this level of scrutiny.6' 4
These programs have little to do with legitimate concerns over productivity and efficiency, and far less intrusive means exist to further
these purposes.6 5 When constitutional provisions are at issue, courts
are generally more willing to scrutinize employer action than they
would normally be with common law torts. '
If the state does not have a constitutional provision such as
California's, or if its courts do not regard a violation of an independent tort as against public policy, employees will find it difficult to
establish that their discharge because of an adventure program violated public policy. While there is disagreement over the meaning of
public policy, all jurisdictions recognizing the public policy exception
indicate that it does not extend so far as to protect an employee's
interest in job security. 7 As indicated earlier, the employer's action
must affect the public at large in some appreciable way.'
Although there is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters

262. 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1097, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
263. Senmore, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1096-98, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 285-86; Luck, 218 Cal.
App. 3d at 17-24, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 627-32. In Luck, the court indicated that the analysis
under the privacy provision of the California Constitution was even more stringent than under
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 217 Cal App. 3d at 20, 267 Cal.
Rptr. at 632. The employer had to establish a compelling interest in order to require a drug
test. While safety is a compelling reason, the plaintiff's job had nothing to do with safety.

Id. at 20, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
264. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.

265. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 261, 263.
267. See, eg., Krauskopf, supra note 209, 232-33, 246-49; The Public Policy Exception,
supra note 209, at 1947-50.
268. See supra note 235.
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that are the subject of public policies from matters purely personal,
a survey of cases in other States involving retaliatory discharges

shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social
rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed.2 9

Following this reasoning, refusing a drug test or any other invasive process might not be seen as protecting other employees who
might also be faced with a choice between keeping their jobs or
acquiescing to the employer's demands?'70 Why should courts interpret public policy so narrowly? Some commentators express concern
that interpreting public policy too broadly will unduly impinge on the
employer's discretion." This exception to the at-will rule would
then swallow the rule. As other commentators believe, the at-will rule
has lost whatever legitimacy or necessity it once had. 2 Perhaps it
is time to scrap a rule that was, after all, judicially created in the first
instance. But in the absence of such a legal transformation, employees
injured by adventure programs may find it difficult to establish the
public policy exception.
2. Implied and Express Contracts
If employers have made written or oral assurances protecting
employees' status, the latter may be able to bring a contract action in
the event that they are discharged because of an adventure pro-

269. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79

(1981).
270. But see Senmore 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1097, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 286. For a criticism
of this perspective, see The Public Policy Exception, supra note 209, at 1947-51.
271. S- e.g., WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 207, at 27-28; Krauskopf, supra note
209, at 247-51.
272. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 12, at 56-78; Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All
Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause" Protection Under Title WI, 2 INDUS. REL L. J.519
(1978); Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OHIO ST. LiJ. 1 (1979); St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads
Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L REV. 56 (1988); Stieber, The Case for Protection of Unorganized Employees Against Unjust Discharge; 1980 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND
ANNUAL MEETING, INDUS. REL RES. Assoc. 155 (B. Dennis ed.); Summers, Individual
Protections Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute; 62 VA. L REv. 481 (1976);
Symposium, Individual Rights in the Workplace: The Employment At Will Issue; 16 U. MICH.
J. L REF. 199 (1983).
But the at-will rule has its defenders as well. See, e.g., Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will 51 U. CHI. L REV. 947 (1984); Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment at
Will Doctrine: Management Considerations, 40 Mo. L. RET. 855 (1982); Note, Limiting the
Right to Terminate at Will - Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35 VAND. L REV.
201 (1982) [hereinafter Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will].
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gram."3 Until recently, employees could not readily prove that their
contractual relationships were other than at-will unless they were
hired for a definite term or were covered by a collective bargaining
agreement? 4 Courts created a number of obstacles unique to employment contracts?25 Spurious doctrines such as mutuality of obligation1 6 and independent consideration 17 placed almost insurmountable barriers in the way of employees attempting to establish
that the employer promised more employment security. 8 Courts
strictly interpreted any oral or written language that allegedly provided for a just cause termination.279
In recent years, courts have begun to view employment contracts

273. This sentence also is meant to cover the likely occurrence of constructive discharge.
Instead of discharging the uncooperative employee, the employer forces the employee to quit
by making the job unpalatable. There is a wide body of case law under Title VII and other
antidiscrimination laws protecting an employee who is forced to quit. Most jurisdictions
recognize constructive discharge as actionable. See supra note 207.
274. Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will, supra note 272, at 201.
275. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 319-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917,
920-21 (1981); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292
N.W.2d 880 (1980); Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual
Employers: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1097-

99 (1984).
276. Mutuality of obligation in the context of the employment relationship means that the
employer's ability to fire cannot be limited if the employee can leave for any or no reason.
Neither can be "bound" unless both are bound. This concept was discredited in contract law
years ago. Summers, supra note 209, at 1098-99. Both parties do not have to have equivalent
obligations in order to have an enforceable contract. Id.
As Weiler has indicated, long term employees are reluctant to leave jobs where they
have accumulated seniority and substantial benefits even if the law does not require them to
stay. Employers have this leverage over these employees. See WEiLnR, supra note 12, at 66.
See also Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay
on the New Property, 20 B.C.L. REV. 457 (1979).
277. Like mutuality of obligation, the requirement of independent consideration means
that an employee could not claim that he or she was something other than an at-will employee on the basis of performance. Even though performance is generally enough to satisfy
the requirement of consideration, courts required more to enforce any limitations on the
employer's right to discharge. One reason performance was not enough is that the employee
was paid for his or her work. However, even contract law states that performance can be
consideration for more than one promise. An equivalent exchange is not required. See Summers, supra note 209, at 1098-99.
278. See, e.g., Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967)
(holding that neither giving up a farm to go to work for an employer, nor working for an
employer, was enough consideration to establish anything other than an at-will relationship);
Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936) (giving up other job
offers was not enough consideration); Summers, supra note 209, at 1098-99.
279. See, eg., Gordon v Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. I1. 1983)
(holding that use of the words "acceptable sales performances" was inadequate to establish
just cause); Summers, supra note 209, at 1098-99.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol19/iss3/4

48

Vogel: Manufacturing Solidarity: Adventure Training for Managers

1991]

ADVENTURE TRAINING

like ordinary ones.' Employees have successfully challenged their
discharges on the basis of employee handbooks, circulars, and even
oral statements." In the setting of adventure programs, there are

two general types of assurances that may give rise to a cause of
action. First, the employer may make assurances that the employee

will not be discharged except for something approximating good or
just cause. 282 Second, the employer might have made specific assurances that it will respect the employee's privacy.'
If the employee can document specific language restricting the
employer's ability to discharge, he or she may be able to use that

language if fired for refusing to take part in an adventure program or
for breaking down on one. One common source of such language can
be found in employee handbooks usually written for dissemination
among supervisors and employees. 284 Such handbooks are usually
designed to give the work force an understanding of the employer's
rules, organization, and requirements. 285 The handbooks often list
reasons for discharge and also outline disciplinary procedures in the
event of a rule's transgression. The rules and procedures in these
manuals are also designed to persuade employees that they do not

need a union for protection.'
In Woolley v. Hoffinann-La Roche, Inc.,2s7 the plaintiff, an engineering section head, alleged that he was fired in violation of contractual provisions in the employee manual that he read during his
employment.? The plaintiff argued that provisions in the manual

280. See, eg., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1988); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
281. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 NJ. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985), modified,
101 NJ. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
282. See infra notes 283-320 and accompanying text.
283. See infra notes 321-27 and accompanying text.
284. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211 (1988); Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc, 99 NJ. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 499
A.2d 515 (1985); Salimi v. Farmers Insurance Corp., 684 P.2d 264 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984);
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Pine River
State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57
N.Y.2d 458, 463 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116
Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal.
App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich.,
408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
285. See generally, WEILEPR, supra note 12, at 11, 53-56.

286. Woolley, 99 NJ. at 295-97, 491 A.2d at 1264.
287. Id. at 284, 491 A.2d at 1257.
288. Id. at 286, 491 A.2d at 1258. Some courts have allowed employees the protection
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meant that he could be fired only for cause and then only after the
employer followed procedures outlined in the manual. 9 The New
Jersey Supreme Court held that provisions in employee manuals can
bind the employer.' Employers issue manuals with job security
provisions to encourage employers to stay and to discourage them
from organizing a union.' Therefore, the court held that the provisions in Hoffmann-La Roche's policy manual were enforceable.'
Courts should construe employer manuals "in accordance with the
reasonable expectations of employees" taking into account the entire
context of their dissemination.'
A policy manual that provides for job security grants an important,
fundamental protection for workers .... If such a commitment is

indeed made, obviously an employer should be required to honor it.
When such a document, purporting to give job security, is distributed by the employer to a work force, substantial injustice may result
if that promise is broken .... [U]nless the language contained in
the manual were such 'that no one could reasonably have thought it
was intended to create legally binding obligations, the termination
provisions of the policy manual would have to be regarded as an
obligation undertaken by the employee. It will not do now for the
company to say it did not mean the things it said in its manual to
be binding? 4
Unfortunately, Woolley left employers with a simple method of
avoiding liability for statements made in the manual - simply include a disclaimer that nothing in the manual is to be construed as
affecting the at-will status of any employee.? 5 Although a subsequent decision suggests that the disclaimer must be clear and conspicuous to be effective, few courts have treated employee manuals and
of statements in handouts even if they have not seen, read or heard about the manuals during
their employment. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579,
613, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980). The rationale for enforcing handbooks under these circumstances is similar to consumer warranty cases. The employer can control what it says about
the working relationship, and employees have a right to expect that the employer will stand
behind the promises and procedures it establishes. For a similar argument as to sales warranties, see Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer Warranties and a Proposal
for Reform, 1985 ARIz. ST. L. 589, 595-99.

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Woolley, 99 NJ. at 286-87, 491 A.2d at 1258.
Id. at 290-301, 491 A.2d at 1260-66.
Id. at 296 n.6, 491 A.2d at 1264 n.6.
Id. at 297, 491 A.2d at 1264.
Id. at 297-98, 491 A.2d at 1264-65.
Id. at 297-99, 491 A.2d at 1264-65.
Id. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1271.
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circulars as they do consumer contracts and have refused to enforce
disclaimers on the grounds of unconscionability despite the adhesive
nature of these provisions and the imbalance of power between employers and employees.' Apart from disclaimers, courts also apply
liberal rules of contract modification seen earlier in the discussion of
consent. The employer can simply destroy the manual after announc-7
ing this to employees or after making substantial modifications.2
Under a unilateral contract theory, the employee "accepts" these
changes if he or she continues to work for the employer.? 8 Courts

296. See Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, 231 NJ. Super. 81, 555 A.2d 12, 15-16
(1989) (holding a disclaimer ineffective because language did not clearly state that all provisions in the handbook were unenforceable). Most courts allow employees to change handbooks or other written policies unilaterally. Appropriate language will be effective. WmTOUT
JUST CAUSE, supra note 207, at 89-95; WEILER, supra note 12, at 54-56. See, eg., Dell v.

Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1987); Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790
F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md. App. 325, 517 A.2d
786 (1986); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983); Yartzoff v.
Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d 356 (1978).
Perhaps courts are reluctant to apply consumer doctrines like unconscionability because
these would interfere too much with the employer's ability to control the workplace. Disclaimers allow employers to change the employment relationship without too much judicial
scrutiny. As long as disclaimers are clear and as long as the employer's subsequent behavior
and statements do not contradict the disclaimer, the employer can recreate an at-will relationship. WEILER, supra note 12, at 54-56; WrhoUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 207, at 91-95;
Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986 Wis. L
REV.733, 748-53.

297. After this discussion, Hoffmann-La Roche followed the court's suggestion and added
this disclaimer.
This manual is a guide for all supervisors and employees. It provides up to
date information on employee policies and procedures.
THIS MANUAL IS NOT AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT. NO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OR LIABILITY ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY
IS INTENDED, NO PROMISE OF ANY KIND IS MADE. The company retains
the right, in itssole discretion, to change any policy, procedure, term or working
condition at any time and in any manner, to the extent permitted by law.
See also WrToUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 207, at 89-95.

298. The unilateral contract doctrine is used liberally to establish the enforceability of
handbooks in the first instance. See Woolley, 99 NJ. at 301-04, 491 A.2d at 1266-68. The
employer and the employee need not have actually bargained for the handbook or other
provisions.
No pre-employment negotiations need take place and the parties' minds need not
meet on the subject, nor does it matter that the employee knows nothing of the
particulars of the employer's policies and practices or that the employer may
change them unilaterally. It is enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its
own interest, to create an environment in which the employee believes that, whatever the personnel policies and practices, they are established and official at any
given time, purport to be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to each
employee. The employer has then created a situation "instinct with an obligation."
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rarely consider that employees have few alternatives. Of course, employers could put a provision in the manual stating that employees
will be expected to go through adventure training as a part of their
job responsibilities. But this is unlikely because the programs are not
used for all employees; furthermore, the employer may fear that applicants will be deterred because of the program.'
Apart from employee manuals or other written documents, the
employer's right to discharge may be limited by the employer's assurances and other conduct over a period of time. In Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc.,'" the plaintiff, a thirty-two year employee, alleged
that he had been dismissed because he had protested the union's
position at the bargaining table 3 ' and that the union had retaliated
by inducing the employer to discharge him.' The breach of contract claims were based on numerous oral assurances during his long
tenure with the company that he would not be fired as long as he did
a "good job." 3 During his employment at See's Candies he rose
from dishwasher to vice-president in charge of production and received no complaints or criticisms of his work.'0 In fact, he was
unaware of any problem until the day he was terminated. 5 The
California Supreme Court found that "an implied-in-fact promise for
some form of continued employment" may be created by duration of
the plaintiff's employment, the promotions and good performance
evaluations over his years of service, and the oral assurances given by
,senior management.30 In other words, the totality of the employer-

408 Mich. at 63, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
Without applying other protective doctrines such as an unconscionability, it is easy for an
employer to retract provisions in the handbook or other documents that provide job security.
See Summers, supra note 209, at 1106-07
299. Of course, employers might include such a provision in job application forms, letters
or other materials designed only for managers and executives. One management attorney
explained that he would recommend this to employers who regularly use adventure programs.
Telephone conversation with Ira Shepard, partner, Schmeltzer & Aptaker in Washington, D.C.
(June 10, 1990).
300. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
301. Id. at 315-19, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918-20.
302. Id. at 318-19, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
303. Id. at 317, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
304. Id. at 317-18, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 918-20.
305. Id. at 317-18, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 919-20.
306. Id. at 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26.
In determining whether there exists an implied-in-fact provision for some form of
continued employment courts have considered a variety of factors in addition to the
existence of independent consideration. These have included, for example, the personnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of service,
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich,
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employee relationship may create an implied promise of continued
employment. 307 In the recent decision of Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp.,m the California Supreme Court allowed a similar claim on
behalf of an employee who, during six years of employment, received
repeated oral assurances of job security together with superior evaluations, bonuses and promotions.' The length of service, though
shorter than in Pugh, was not dispositive. 310 Even a short-term employee may have enforceable assurances if the "totality of the circumstances" indicates that the employer limited its own right to fire the
employee.1
Assuming an employee is able to establish that he or she is not
an at-will employee, how would good or just cause protect employees
from the consequences of adventure training programs? As with most
contract terms, just cause is subject to a number of interpretations. If
language defining the term is present, courts first try to define just
cause in these terms. Otherwise, they look to other sources as a
guide. Collective bargaining agreements routinely contain just cause
provisions, and labor arbitration literature provides a general understanding of the concept. 1 According to a leading authority:
A 'no' answer to any one or more of the following questions normally signifies that just and proper cause did not exist ....
1. Did the company give to the employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the possible or probable disciplinary consequences of the
employee's conduct? ...
2. Was the company's rule or managerial order reasonably related to
(a) the orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the company's business, and (b) the performance that the company might properly
expect of the employee? ...
3. Did the company, before administering discipline to an employee,
make an effort to discover whether the employee did in fact violate
or disobey a rule or order of management? ...

actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
307. The court is examining the prospect of job security in terms familiar to any contract. The only thing unusual about the court's analysis is that modem contract analysis has
not been applied to the employment setting. See Summers, supra note 209, at 1097-1108.
308. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 654 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
309. Id. at 681, 765 P.2d at 388, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
310. Id. at 681, 765 P.2d at 387-88, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
311. Id. at 680-81, 765 P.2d at 387-88, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
312. See F. ELKOURI & E. EIXOURi, How ARBITRAION WORKS (4th ed. 1984).
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4. Was the company's investigation conducted fairly and objectively? ...

5. At the investigation did the [manager] obtain substantial evidence
or proof that the employee was guilty as charged? ...
6. Has the company applied its rules, orders, and penalties
evenhandedly and without discrimination to all employees? ...
7. Was the degree of discipline administered by the company in a

particular case reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the
employee's
proven offense and (b) the service record with the com313
pany?
This definition of just cause incorporates both substantive and
procedural protections. Much of it concerns not just the reasons for
discipline or discharge, but the procedures that management must use
to investigate, to give notice to, and to punish the errant employee.31 4 This definition also reflects the blue collar setting of most
labor arbitration proceedings. With managers, courts are generally
inclined to give the employer more leeway in terminations because
315
these employees occupy sensitive or confidential positions.
In regard to adventure programs, the central issues are whether
such a program is required for the effective and efficient operation of
the employer's business and whether it is appropriate to require managerial employees to go through arduous physical and psychological
exercises. 316 The answer depends on whether the court will accept
the employer's assertion that these programs are essential to the legitimate requirements of the workplace and the employee's job description. 7 Certainly the notice requirements of just cause are not met
when employers fail to advise employees that this kind of training is
part of their job responsibilities or when employers do not even tell

313. Enterprise Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 359, 362-64 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.);
Note, Employer Opportunism and the Need for a Just Cause Standard, 103 HARV. L REV.,
510, 515 n.22 (1989). See also The Public Policy Exception, supra note 209, at 1948 n.111;
Abrams & Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985
DUKE LJ. 594, 599-601 n30; Comment, Understanding the Just Cause Defense, 65 U. DET.
L REV. 527, 529-30 n.9 (1988).
314. See Summers, supra note 272, at 499-508.
315. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 928. See St. Antoine, supra note
272, at 72. For a criticism of treating high-level employees differently from other employees
under Title VII see Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L.

REv. 947 (1982).
316. See supra notes 13-40 and accompanying text (discussing the theory behind adventure programs).
317. See supra notes 40-84 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of transference).
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employees what to expect if they participate.3 18 Given the tenuous
connection between the exercises and any workplace benefit, as well
as the potential psychological harm that could result, courts may find
that the employer lacked good or just cause to dismiss an employee
who refuses to go or who performs below the employer's expectations.3 19 Even the extra latitude shown in cases of managerial employees must have its limits. It would be counterintuitive for a court
to uphold the discharge of a manager when the activities might well
create liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress or invasion of privacy.' 2
If employees are not fortunate enough to have the job security
provided by just cause, they may still have contractual protection if
the employer has promulgated a policy of protecting employees'
privacy, as was the case in Rulon-Miller v IBM.321 As indicated earlier, Rulon-Miller sued IBM after she was discharged for having a
relationship with a former IBM manager who worked for a rival
computer company. 322 In addition to bringing an emotional distress
claim, the plaintiff also sued for wrongful discharge, relying on
protections afforded to all IBM employees by the "Watson
memo." 3' The memo, written by IBM's chairperson, stated that an
employee's private life was generally not the concern of management
and that employees would not be dismissed for behavior outside the
workplace unless these actions interfered with their work.32 The
court found that the memo provided contractual protection for the
plaintiff, whose relationship in no way compromised IBM or interfered with her work.3 2
While the Watson memo refers to employees' behavior off the
job, the gist of the memorandum is that employees' actions that are

318. See supra notes 141-147 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.

320. See supra notes 85-206 and accompanying text (discussing intentional infliction of
emotional distress and invasion of privacy).
321. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
322. 162 Cal. App. 3d at 244-46, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 527-29. See supra notes 106-11 and
accompanying text.
323. The actual claim was for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing which, at the time of this decision, could sound in tort as well as in contract. Id. at
248-54, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 530-33. However, the good faith claim was based on the
employer's failure to extend the contractual protection of the Watson memo to the plaintiff.
The advantage of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is that it allowed the
plaintiff to recover tort damages. See infra notes 330-358 and accompanying text.
324. Rulon-Miller, 162 Cal. App. at 248-50, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 530-31.
325. Id. at 250-51, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 530-32.
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unrelated to the job should not be the basis of an employment decision, except when this behavior directly affects the employee's job in
some demonstrable manner 26 Although a company's training program is not an off-duty activity, outdoor training programs require
employees to participate in exercises that have little to do with the
work that employees are hired to do. Programs force employees to
expose aspects of their personalities and psychological make-up that
they would ordinarily keep private. The Watson memo or other equivalent language protects employees' private activities and private feelings whenever possible. Outdoor adventure programs intrude in serious ways on employees' legitimate expectations of privacy. 27 If the
employer pledges to respect their privacy, then it should be held
liable for failing to keep that promise.
As with all contractual claims, success depends on language and
understandings between the employer and the employee. While recent
cases have loosened the old restrictions on circumventing the at-will
doctrine, the more liberal rules of contract formation and modification
also make it easier for the employer to modify this contractual relationship with disclaimers and announcements of new policies. Unless
courts begin to use protective doctrines associated with consumer
contracts such as unconscionability, employees may not be able to
bring contractual claims as employers grow more sophisticated in
dealing with the case law. Employers will simply rewrite handbooks,
328
application forms and any other communications with employees.
3. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing originated as
3 29
a contract doctrine to protect the expectations of the parties.
Good faith or "honesty in fact" is implied in every contract and requires parties to avoid behavior that is designed to undermine or
evade the requirements of the contract.3" The Restatement (Second)

326. Id. at 248-50, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 530-31.
327. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
328. If courts want to protect employees fully from overreaching, then they will have to
prohibit the enforcement of disclaimers under protective contract doctrines such as unconscionability. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). As Llewellyn said long ago, "[c]overt tools are never
reliable tools." Llewellyn, Book Reviews, 52 HARV. L RBv. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing 0.

PRAUSNrr, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CoNTRAcTs INENOUSH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)).
329. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).

330. E.A. FARNSWORT,
note 207, at 107-10.

CONTRACTS § 7.71 (2d ed. 1989); WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, supra

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol19/iss3/4

56

Vogel: Manufacturing Solidarity: Adventure Training for Managers

1991]

ADVENTURE TRAINING

of Contracts section 205 comment a explains good faith this way:
Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of
types of conduct characterized as involving "bad faith" because they
violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.
The appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith also
varies with the circumstances. 331
Given the amorphous character of good faith and fair dealing,
most jurisdictions refuse to recognize good faith and fair dealing as
an exception to the at-will doctrine.332 Of those jurisdictions that do,
most have restricted its application to situations similar to those that

trigger it in other kinds of contracts. 333 For example, courts apply

the doctrine when the employer discharges an employee for the pur-

pose of depriving the employee of commissions, bonuses or pensions
that he or she has earned or is about to earn. 334 Other jurisdictions,

331. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrS § 205 comment d (1979).
Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in performance even
though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may
require more than honesty. A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking
off; willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of power to specify terms,
and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance.
Id. This description does little to clarify the meaning of good faith in the employment
context. See WrnoUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 207, at 108-10.
332. 'Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co, 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1061 (1984); Pamar
v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 377, 652 P.2d 625, 629 (1982). See also Hugo v.
Tomaszewski, 155 II. App. 3d 906, 508 N.E.2d 1139 (1987); Citizens State Bank v.
LibertellL, 215 NJ. Super. 190, 194-95, 521 A.2d 867, 869 (1987); Hamblen v. Danners, Inc.,
478 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58
N.Y.2d 293, 300-02, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235-36 (1983); Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 394-85, 710 P.2d 1025, 1039-40 (1983) (holding
that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing infringes too greatly on the employer's
"legitimate exercise of management discretion'); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md.
31, 432 A.2d 469 (1981); Prussing v. General Motors Corp., 403 Mich. 366, 269 N.W. 2d
181 (1978); Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees, 26 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 449, 467-72 (1985).
333. See, ag., Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); Gram v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 391 Mass. 333, 461 N.E.2d 796 (1984).
334. This interpretation of good faith and fair dealing is similar to its use in contracts
outside of the employment setting. See Mitford, 666 P.2d at 1000; Gram, 391 Mass. at 333,
461 N.E.2d at 769; Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251

(1977).
Even though New York does not recognize the implied covenant of good faith and
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notably California, have interpreted good faith and fair dealing to be

almost the equivalent of just cause, especially when long-term employees are discharged without a legitimate business reason.33 The
good faith doctrine's potential to provide employees with the equivalent of just cause explains why many jurisdictions have rejected
it.336 California also allowed an employee to recover tort damages
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.337

fair dealing in at-will relationships, a salesman was allowed to recover commissions earned
before termination. See Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 769 F2d 109 (2d Cir. 1985).
335. See, eg., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722, 729 (1980). But see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d
373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988) (holding that breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in the employment relationship sounds only in contract). California, Nevada
and Montana are the only states that have recognized a broad application of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. However, Montana recently passed a wrongful discharge statute
that restricts recovery of tort damages. See Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987).
336. See Note, Ensuring Good Faith in Dismissals, 63 TEX. L REV. 285, 294 (1984).
337. Courts refashioned the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a tort in
cases where insurance companies refused to pay claims as required under the insurance
policies. This kind of breach was treated as a tort because of the disparity in bargaining
power between the parties, the special noncommercial character of insurance contracts, the
complete dependence on the company when a claim arises, and the inadequacy of contract
damages to deter a breach or to compensate the insured. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co. 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66
Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
Starting with Cleary, California Courts of Appeal applied this same rationale to the
employment setting. See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text. For example, in Wallis
v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984), the court stated that,
as in insurance contracts, there is a clear disparity of power between employers and employees. Moreover, employees are extremely dependent on employers for salary and benefits, and
employees enter into such contracts for financial and personal security. Therefore, the loss of
employment involves more than the loss of income; the trauma of a discharge damages an
individual's self-esteem. As a result, contract damages would not adequately compensate
employees because the employees are not generally allowed to recover for mental distress
damages. Furthermore, contract liability does not generally include punitive damages, even
when the employer's conduct is outrageous and even when such damages are necessary to
deter such conduct in the future. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 702-03,
707-10, 716 P.2d 373, 402, 405-08, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 241, 244-46 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
But see id., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (rejecting the comparison between
insurance and employment contracts). First, Foley stated that inequality is "not a universal
characteristic of employment contracts." The employer does not necessarily benefit from
breaking an employment contract with the employee in the way an insurance company does
when it refuses to pay a claim. Id. at 691, 765 P.2d at 394, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232. Second,
there is no basis for assuming that a special or fiduciary relationship exists between employer
and employee. Third, the employment contract is no different from any other commercial
contract. Unlike the insured, an employee can usually mitigate any damage caused by the
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Treating good faith and fair dealing as a tort is important because tort
damages allow a far more generous recovery than contract damages;
plaintiffs can collect mental distress and punitive damages.3 38
The potential of good faith and fair dealing to undermine the atwill doctrine is best illustrated by. California cases such as Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc.339 In Cleary, an eighteen-year employee alleged that he was discharged for theft without a complete investigation."O The California Court of Appeal found that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing required that a long-term employee be discharged only for good cause when the employer provided
procedures to adjudicate employee disputes similar to the one concerning the plaintiff."4 The combination of longevity of service and
the existence of grievance procedures meant that the employer must
demonstrate just cause to sustain this discharge.' 4 A long-term employee expects that an employer will not treat him or her in an arbitrary fashion. Similarly, an employee also expects the employer to
follow the disciplinary procedure that it established in the first instance. 3 If the plaintiff is ultimately able to establish a lack of
good cause at trial, then he or she can receive tort damages.'
After Cleary, subsequent California Court of Appeal decisions
split as to how to apply the implied covenant of good faith and fair

employer's breach. Finally, there is no fundamental conflict of interest between the parties as
there is in insurance contracts. Id. at 690-93, 765 P2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232-34.
338. Mental distress and punitive damages figure prominently in California employment
cases. The desire to limit the employer's liability and reduce the number of wrongful discharge cases is the rationale behind Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d at 654, 765
P.2d at 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 211. Many of these cases are brought on a contingent fee
basis, and if tort damages are unavailable, fewer cases are likely to be brought. After Foley,
only professional or managerial employees with significant contract damages will be able to
bring an action. Jung & Harkness, Life After Foley: The Future of Wrongful Discharge
Litigation, 41 HASTINGS U. 131, 144-52 (1989).
339. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). The application of good faith
and fair dealing to the employment setting in California came from a suggestion in the
California Supreme Court decision of Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 179
n.12, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 n.12 (1980), that the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing might apply to employment contracts. California Courts of
Appeal followed the suggestion and developed the doctrine to its fullest extent before the
California Supreme Court in Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 654, 765 P.2d at 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. at
211, effectively destroyed the doctrine.
340. 111 Cal. App. 3d at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
341. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
342. Id. at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
343. Id. at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
344. Id.
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dealing to employment cases. One line of cases required facts similar
to those of Cleary - only employees with long seniority and with
the protection of express policies governing the adjudication of employee disputes s 5 could prevail in this cause of action.6 The
other line of cases did not limit the doctrine to facts like those in
Cleary.'M Instead, employees had to show that they had some expectations grounded in contract and that employers attempted to deprive them of these contractual expectations by asserting "the existence of good cause for discharge... without probable cause and in
bad faith."' "[A]n employer acts in bad faith in discharging an
employee if and only if [it] does not believe [it] has a legal right to
discharge the employee."3 9 As a result, the employer may have had
to show good cause for the discharge and pay tort damages under a
wider variety of circumstances than under Cleary.
But this argument over the applicability of the doctrine became
irrelevant after the California Supreme Court's decision in Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp.350 Under Foley, plaintiffs will not be able to
recover tort damages under this theory at all.3 51 Foley questioned
the basic rationale used in all of the earlier good faith and fair dealing cases, denying that the employment relationship is similar to
insurance contracts, the context in which the doctrine originally developed.2 Furthermore, Foley limits good faith and fair dealing to enforcement of implied or express contract assurances of job security353 and also limits the remedy for a breach of these assurances to

345. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 205 Cal. App. 3d 344, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985),
rev'd on other grounds, 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
346. See Foley, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 348, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 870; Newfield v. Ins. Co. of
the W, 156 Cal. App. 3d 440, 203 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1984); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116
Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
347. See Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is established when an employer acts in bad
faith, and frustrates an employee's enjoyment of contractual rights); Koehrer v. Superior Ct.,
181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1986); Gray v. Superior Ct., 181 Cal. App. 3d
813, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986); Khanna v. Microdata Corp. 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 860 (1985) (noting that a breach is established whenever an employer acts in bad faith
and with intent to frustrate the employee's enjoyment of contractual rights); Crosier v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983).
348. Koehrer, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 1171, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
349. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d. at 711, 765 P.2d at 409, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 247 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
350. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
351. Id. at 682-700, 765 P.2d at 388-402, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227-40.
352. Id. at 682-700, 765 P.2d at 388-402, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 230-39. See supra note 337.
353. Id.
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contract damages regardless of the motivation for the breach. 54
Employees discharged as a result of adventure programs are in a
far stronger position when they establish that the employer can dis-

miss them only for good cause. As discussed previously, adventure
programs should not withstand the careful scrutiny that good cause
requires. 55 If the few jurisdictions that recognize the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing follow California's lead, good
faith will be important only if the employee can establish that he or
she has the protection of oral or written assurances discussed in the
last section. 35 6 Even so, tort damages would be unavailable. Of
course, if employees have the protection of handbooks or other assurances of job security, it is difficult to perceive what good faith and
fair dealing adds to their protection. 7 The possibility of tort damages makes this cause of action attractive.35 s
I.

ABUSIVE CORPORATE ADVENTURE PROGRAMS:
THE NEED FOR A STATUTE

Perhaps, as management expert Peter Drucker has said, corporations will stop sending employees on adventure programs when juries
award multimillion dollar verdicts to injured employees.3 19 As indicated in the preceding section, there is the potential for such a verdict, but no guarantee under existing law. ° The most likely tort
cause of action, intentional infliction of emotional distress, is too illdefined to provide much guidance. 6 ' Adventure programs may invade an employee's privacy, but courts allow employers to avoid
liability by merely announcing ahead of time that employees will be

354. Id. at 699-700, 765 P.2d at 388402, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39.
355. See supra notes 311-20 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 273-328 and accompanying text.
357. Good faith and fair dealing, even in this restrictive sense, may matter if an employee is discharged so that the employer can avoid paying bonuses or pensions that the employee has earned. See supra note 334. If the employee has no assurances of job security, good
faith and fair dealing may be the only recourse. Even so, Foley indicates that the employee
can recover only contract damages.
358. See Jung & Harkness, supra note 338, at 140-44. See also WEILER, supra note 12,
at 82. Most surveys indicate that most wrongful discharge cases are brought by professional
and managerial employees who can afford the costs of litigation and who face the prospect
of larger awards. Id. The demise of good faith as a tort cause of action will only increase
this trend.
359. Interview with Peter Drucker, Mac Neil/Lehrer Newshour (Sept. 4, 1989).
360. See supra notes 96-358 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 96-153 and accompanying text.
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expected to participate. If the employee continues to work, then he or
she will be deemed to have consented to this invasion.6 2

Success under any of the wrongful discharge causes of action
depends on circumstances that may not be present in all cases. Obviously, the employee must have been discharged or pressured to resign. 63 To prevail on the tort theory of discharge against public
policy, employees must have either established the commission of an
independent tort or be fortunate enough to reside in a state whose
constitution protects private employees' privacy.' If the employer
has issued assurances protecting privacy or providing for discharge
only in the event of just cause, then employees may prevail on contract theories.365 Contract causes of action, however, limit damages
to economic loss - lost wages, salary, or benefits. Injured employees

cannot recover for mental distress and, in most cases, they cannot
recover punitive damages.' Furthermore, even contract recoveries
may be unavailable if employers publish disclaimers denying any con-

tractual protection.' 6
Given the limitations of existing tort and contract causes of
action, statutory protection may produce more just and consistent
results in discouraging the use of corporate adventure programs. Numerous states have passed labor statutes regulating questionable employment practices in recent years. For example, many have enacted
laws restricting drug and polygraph testing partly because existing law
was inadequate to protect employees' privacy.6 8 Even Congress has

362. See supra notes 154-206 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 215-72 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 273-328 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 330, 358 and accompanying text. See Mallor, supra note 332
(arguing in favor of allowing punitive damages in wrongful discharge cases).
367. See supra notes 295-98, 327-28 and accompanying text.
368. Forty-four states have enacted some form of polygraph regulation. These statutes
regulate matters ranging from whether the polygraph can be used at all in the employment
setting to who can administer tests. See ALA. CODE §§ 34-25-1 to -36 (1985); ALASKA STAT.
§ 23.10.037 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-2701 to -2715 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17-32-101 to -214 (1987); CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-51g (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 19, § 704 (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 493.561-.579
(West 1981) (repealed 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-36-1 to -22 (1988); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 378-26 to -29 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-903 to -904 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111,
§§ 2401-32 (Smith-Hurd 1978); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 25-30-2-1 to -5 (West 1990); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 730.4 (West 1990); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 329.010 to .990 (Michie 1990);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 2831-2854 (West 1988); MEt. REv. STAT..ANN. tit. 32, §§ 7151-69
(1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1985); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19B
(West 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.201.209 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol19/iss3/4

62

Vogel: Manufacturing Solidarity: Adventure Training for Managers

1991]

ADVENTURE TRAINING

9
passed a comprehensive law regulating the use of polygraphs.3
Passing a statute that bans the use of corporate adventure programs
would be0 consistent with the recent legislative concern over protecting
37
privacy.

§
§

181.75 (West 1991); MIss. CODE ANN. 8§ 73-29-1 to -49 (1989); MONT. CODE ANN.
39-2-304 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1901 to -1936 (1987); NEV.. REV. STAT.
88 648.005-210 (1991); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 40A-1 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 61-26-1 to -15 (1990); N.Y. LAB. LAW 8§ 733-39 (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. 88 74C-1 to
-33 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-31-01 to -17 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 59,
§§ 1451-76 (West 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.225 to 227 (1989); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7321 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-6.1-1 to -3 (1986); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 40-53-10 to -250 (Law Co-op 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 8§ 36-30-1 to -3 (1986);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-27-101 to -129 (1990); TEX. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413
(29ce) (Vernon 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-37-1 to -16 (1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§8 494a-494e (1987); VA. CODE ANN. 8§ 54.1-1800 to -1806 (1988); WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 49.44.120-.135 (1990); W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-5a to -Sd (1989); Wis. STAT. § 111.37
(1988). See supra note 204 (discussing drug testing statutes).
369. See Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988).
370. In fact, it might be easier to pass a statute like the one proposed in this article,
which would ban only a specific employment practice, than it would be to press for a more
encompassing statute that required just cause to sustain a discharge. For a similar argument in
favor of a statute enumerating prohibited reasons for discharge instead of a just cause statute,
see generally Perritt, Wrongful Dismissal Legislation, 35 UCLA L REV. 65 (1987). As one
commentator said:
Usually, statutes are not enacted because they incorporate good ideas or principles;
rather they are enacted because organized interest groups lobby for their enactment.
Employees who have not been organized by a labor union are exactly that: unorganized and therefore lacking in the unity of purpose and effort that produces a
successful lobby. On the other hand, employers have associations that traditionally
have lobbied against legislation conflicting with employer interests, and they may
be counted upon to oppose legislation that would curtail the present power of
employers to terminate employment without proof of cause.
Peck, supra note 272, at 3; see also Perritt, supra at 68-72, 81.
A number of commentators have advocated a just cause statute. See, eg., Bellace, A
Right to FairDismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 207 (1983);
St. Antoine, supra note 272, at 70-81; Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a FederalStatute, 16 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 319 (1983); Summers, supra
note 272; Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L
REV. 7 (1988). Enactment of a just cause statute would help to provide the kind of employment security needed to create the kind of trust, teamwork and commitment that companies
expect adventure training to establish. As indicated earlier, the insecurity associated with the
at-will status makes it difficult for employees to make a long term commitment to their
employers; they can be discharged at any time. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying
text. Eliminating the risks of adventure training is easier than addressing the corporate malaise
that prodded companies to start using these programs.
While most industrialized countries have some general protection against unjust discharge, see Bellace, supra; Summers, supra note 272, at 483-84, 508-19, thus far only
Montana has passed a general wrongful discharge statute designed to cover all nonunion
employees. See Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1987). While I favor a just cause statute, at the moment, there is little
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In addition to consistency, a properly drafted statute could prevent the uncertainty of case-by-case determinations. The legislature
can hold hearings and determine the desirability of such programs.
Once a statute bans such programs, injured employees would not have
to establish that the programs are intrusive and damaging in every
lawsuit. At the same time, judges would not have to decide if they
are interfering with legitimate management decisions. The legislature
will have made that determination for them; the employee would
simply have to establish that the employer has violated the statute.371 A statute that bans these programs can also make it easier
for the employer to know whether it can use particular programs or
types of adventure training. At present, employers can. only speculate
as to what might happen if employees are psychologically injured as
a result of participating in the programs; a statute can eliminate this
uncertainty.3 72 Finally, if Congress passes a statute, then employers
and employees will not confront the problem of inconsistent statutes
or case law from one state to the next. Many large corporations have
work sites and employees in a number of states; a federal statute
73
could eliminate potential inconsistencies.

prospect of such a statute passing in more populous states or at the federal level. If such a
statute does pass, employees who are discharged as a result of an adventure program should
be able to prevail. See supra notes 311-20 and accompanying text. However, such a statute
would be of no assistance to employees who have been damaged by adventure training but
have not been discharged. To protect these employees, the statute proposed in this article
would be essential.
371. Of course, if courts do not like the statute, they can undermine its effectiveness.
Recent Supreme Court decisions severely curtailing the effectiveness of Title VII are illustrative. See, eg., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (dismantling disparate impact theory); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that white employees are
allowed to challenge a consent decree long after the original lawsuit); Belton, The Disman.
tling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the Future of Title WI: The Need for a
Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L & PoL'Y REv. 223 (1990); Norton, The End of the Griggs
Economy: Doctrinal Adjustment for the New American Workplace, 8 YALE L. & POLY REV.
197 (1990); Ralston, Court vs. Congress: Judicial Interpretation of the Civil Rights Acts and
Congressional Response, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 205 (1990).
372. Much of this depends on how the statute is drafted and how many exceptions it
creates. See infra notes 373-77 and accompanying text. See also Perritt, supra note 370, at
69, 82-83.
373. Given the conservative administration in Washington, some states may prove to be
more receptive to labor legislation. For example, Stieber & Murray, supra note 370, argue
that states may be appropriate laboratories to experiment with just cause discharge statutes:
There are, of course, good reasons to focus on state legislatures as the primary
arena for statutory reform. Enacting such legislation on a state-by-state basis would
permit the variety and experimentation that is necessary to test new legislation
before introducing it into the federal system. As a practical matter, it may also be
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Assuming that a statute banning adventure programs is desirable,
what should it provide and how can it define adventure programs
with enough specificity to avoid including outdoor activities that do
not present the same kind of threat to employees, such as ordinary
retreats?374 The best definition would cover different kinds of adventure training programs. The statute should prohibit the use of
training programs that place employees in severe "physically and/or
mentally demanding" 375 exercises designed to increase trust, teamwork and risk-taking.376 This definition includes not only the "outward bound" activities discussed throughout this article but also some
of the mental exercises associated with the new-age training programs
in vogue with a few employers in recent years.3" The objective
would be to ban the use of such programs except where the job
requires it, as for example in police work or fire fighting.378 The

easier to persuade a few of the more progressive state legislatures to break new
ground in this area than it would be to move such legislation through both houses
of Congress and across a president's desk.
Id. at 336.

374. Certain kinds of corporate recreational activities do not have the same potential for
psychological injury as adventure programs. For example, companies often have picnics,
softball games or other kinds of recreational activities. While these activities are also designed
to create social bends among employees and between them and the employer, these generally
do not pose the kind of psychological risks associated with adventure programs. See supra
notes 13-40, and accompanying text (describing adventure training).
This statute does not hold operators of adventure programs liable. As indicated earlier,
operators might well be held liable under common law tort such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress or invasion of privacy. See supra notes 148-53, 204-06, and accompanying
text. Because corporate adventure programs require the cooperation of employers to deliver
employees as participants, a statute prohibiting employers from using such programs should
provide an adequate deterrent. If an injured employee wants to sue the operators, he or she
can sue under the tort theories discussed earlier. The statute would not preempt these causes
of action.
375. Galpin, supra note 47, at 2.
376. Id. The term "place" rather than "require" is used to cover the situation in which
an employer claims that participation is only "voluntary." As indicated earlier, such programs
are not voluntary, regardless of how they are presented to employers. See supra notes 13347,
194-99, and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 88. See also Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle
Persuasion Under the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L.REV. 1 (1977).

378. Police and fire fighters have their own boot or training camps that are far more
rigorous than adventure training, but that are attended for the same reasons. Police officers'
and fire fighters' jobs require split-second timing and extensive esprit de corps. Few jobs
require this level of physical cooperation or this kind of danger. Professional sports teams
also have their own rigorous training programs. Even with these camps, the Minnesota
Vikings decided to use an adventure training program, the Pecos River Program in New
Mexico, last year. The high ropes exercises frightened most of the football players as much
as other employees. There is no evidence, however, that the program improved their perfor-
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advantage of banning, rather than simply regulating, is simplicity;,
employers are told that, with few exceptions, they cannot require
employees to go through such programs.379
In the event that the employer does require or "strongly suggests" that employees participate in adventure programs, the statute
should provide a private cause of action that allows injured employees to recover damages covering economic loss, mental distress, punitive damages and attorney's fees.' Generous damage awards are far
more likely to deter employers than allowing recovery only for lost
wages or salaries. 1 Also, employees would have less difficulty

mance; their team record was no better than those of many teams who did not use such
programs. See Werder, Viddngs Get It Together, Nat'l Sports Daily, July 2, 1990, at 36, 37.
379. A ban is more appropriate because, as indicated earlier, there are few employment
settings where this kind of training is appropriate. See supra notes 41-84 and accompanying
text. Simply regulating adventure training programs assumes that these are appropriate under
certain circumstances, a proposition that this article rejects. A ban is also more protective
because injured employees would not have to show that their employers failed to have a
legitimate reason for using this kind of training. Simply requiring or using such a program
would violate the statute. In addition, the easier it is to establish a violation of the statute,
the easier it will be for injured employees to prevail.
380. In addition to damages, the statute should also provide for reinstatement and other
injunctive relief. In common law wrongful discharge actions, courts will not usually order
reinstatement because reinstatement is a form of specific performance, and specific performance is not usually granted in personal service contracts. See 3 EA. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 12A-.7 (2d ed. 1990); Summers, supra note 272, at 531. But most federal labor
statutes authorize reinstatement. See, eg., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 625(b),(c) (1988); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988); Civil Rights Act
of 1964 tit. VII, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). The reinstatement remedy tends
to work better in a unionized workplace because the union is better able to protect the
employee from future retaliation. See Bellace, supra note 370, at 241; Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE LU. 916, 934-38 (1979); Stieber & Murray, supra
note 370, at 339-40; WEILER, supra note 12, at 97. Even so, reinstatment ought to be
available if the employee wants to return to the employer's workplace.
Furthermore, to protect employees from retaliation by the employer, this statute should
also contain an anti-retaliation provision like those found in many labor statutes. See, e.g.,
A.D.EA. § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 263(d) (1982); Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, § 704(a), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988); N.L.R.A. § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)(3) (1988). If the employees are still working when they bring an action, the employer is likely to dismiss them. The
anti-retaliation provision would provide additional protection from this abuse.
381. For example, Title VII has been criticized because the statute allows monetary
recovery only for lost wages or salaries. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982); Ralston, supra
note 371, at 218. Because mitigation is required, the recovery is often reduced further.
Therefore, the recovery allowed is too small to be an effective deterrent. For a similar
criticism of § 8(a)(3) of the N.LRA., see WEtLER, supra note 12, at 249. As a response to
this and other difficulties created by the recent Supreme Court cases interpreting Title VII
and other Civil Rights statutes, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st
Cong., 2d. Sess. The President vetoed the bill and this veto was sustained by only one vote.
Holmes, President Vetoes Bill on Job Rights: Showdown is Set, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1990,
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finding lawyers to handle their claims. In addition to a private cause
of action, the statute should also allow the attorney general or some
other executive agency to bring suit against employers.2 Government action may be able to stop employers from using these programs in situations in which employees may not be able to bring
suits on their own. 3 However, if the experience of other labor law

statutes is a guide, private parties are far more likely3 4to bring law-

suits even when the government has the option to sue. 8
A federal law would have a number of advantages over state
laws. First, the federal government has greater resources to enforce a
law dealing with corporate adventure programs. The Labor Department, has administrative structures in place to enforce this and other
labor statutes.' Second, as was mentioned, a federal statute provides uniformity; an employer does not have to worry about different
regulations in different states. Employees will not have to worry that
employers will send them to states where adventure programs are
permitted, as could easily occur with these kinds of programs.3

at Al, col. 4; Lewis, President Veto of Rights Measure Survives by I Vote, N.Y. Times, Oct.
25, 1990, at Al, col. 3.
382. If Congress passes such a statute, the Labor Department would probably handle
enforcement. If a state passes the statute, then the state attorney general will probably bring
the action.
383. In addition, the government could bring an action against a number of employers at
the same time, an option unavailable to employees.
384. The failure of governmental agencies to enforce labor laws can be due to a number
of interrelated factors: (1) the pressure of a conservative political climate hostile to laws
protecting employees; (2) the allocation of inadequate resources to enforce the law; and
(3) the requirement of time-consuming and cumbersome processes to take any action. For a
sobering analysis of the National Labor Relations Board's inability and unwillingness to
enforce the National Labor Relations Act, see WEILER, supra note 12, at 225-81. So disenchanted is Weiler with the Board's ability to enforce labor laws that he proposes that employees dismissed for union activity in violation of N.L.R.A. § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 58(A)(3)
(1988), should be allowed to bring a private cause of action in state court for wrongful
discharge. This change would involve removing the "preemptive effort of the N.L.RA. on the
state court's authority to include the right to join a union among the categories of public
policy." At the present time, only the NLRB can handle this and other unfair labor practices
under the Act. WEi.ER, supra note 12, at 249. Allowing a private tort cause of action with
large damage awards would "put teeth in section 8(a)(3)" that do not exist now. Id. At the
present time, there are too many cases for the Board to handle quickly and the monetary
recovery (back pay) allowed under the Act does not act as an adequate deterrent. Id.
385. The Labor Department already has enforcement responsibilities for a number of
federal labor statutes. See, eg., Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, .29 U.S.C. §§ 401531 (1982); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). One more statute should
not present an administrative burden.
386. Many of the adventure programs are located in wilderness areas in a different state
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Finally, a federal statute makes a strong symbolic statement that protecting employee privacy and peace of mind is a national priority. u
If Congress declines to act in this area, states should take the initiative. While the impact of state regulation is not as great, Congress
may feel some pressure to pass such a bill if a number of states take
the lead. Even employers may then prefer to have a single statute
covering all the states. Inconsistent state laws may create an impetus
to pass a federal statute.
CONCLUSION

Corporations are using outdoor adventure programs in an effort
to create trusting, loyal and innovative employees in a short time
without making the kind of structural changes that would promote
and nurture such qualities in the workplace. This kind of quick fix, a
short- term approach to complex structural problems, is not only ineffective, but also harmful to the dignity and mental health of affected
employees. In the process of remaking employees, adventure programs
intrude on the most basic human fears and emotions, all in the name
of efficiency and profit. Requiring employees to participate in these
programs should create liability for employers and program operators
under tort doctrines such as intentional infliction of emotional distress,
invasion of privacy and possibly wrongful discharge. If employers
have given oral or written assurances of job security, employees may
also recover for breach of contract. However, only a statute banning
the use of adventure programs in the corporate setting will adequately
protect employees' privacy and dignity from this kind of intrusion. If
employers wish to transform their employees, they must begin to
transform the workplace.

than the location of the employee's workplace. The Outward Bound programs, for example,
are located in Colorado, North Carolina and coastal Maine. See supra note 10.
If an adventure program takes place in Colorado and the employee is employed in a
different state, constitutional limitations on conflict of law principles suggest that the state in
which the employee is employed may have sufficient contacts or relationships to assert the
application of its own law. Thus, if the workplace is located in a state that has a law
banning the use of adventure programs, that law may govern. See generally Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
387. This was part of the rationale for passing the federal law regulating polygraph
testing. See Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988).
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